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Summary 
 
The implementation of nature conservation as a land use form is characterized by persistent 
conflicts and low acceptance by landowners and other users of the considered land area. The 
thesis applies an economic approach that is understood as the consideration of opportunities 
and problems of social interaction that aims at mutual benefits (Homann 2002: 63; Homann & 
Suchanek 2005: 4).  
 
Nature conservation is treated as a normal economic good that is demanded and supplied. 
Human action and human choices regarding the good "nature conservation" can be explained 
and predicted when including the structure of the exchange and transfer of property rights for 
nature conservation. The property rights perspective on nature conservation demonstrates an 
unambiguous understanding of the rights individuals are willing to abandon for demanding and 
supplying nature conservation. The successful implementation of different aims and strategies 
of nature conservation requires different property rights. The loss of the right to choose other 
alternatives implies subjective costs (Knight 1924: 592f.; Buchanan 1981: 14) that cannot be 
reduced to pecuniary units and landowners. This approach broadens the understanding of the 
term "costs" related to nature conservation. 
 
Different organizational and institutional arrangements can be found in practical nature 
conservation. Both the demand for and the supply of nature conservation is organized either 
individually or collectively. Property rights for the good “nature conservation” are either 
exchanged voluntarily or involuntarily by applying takings and eminent domain.  
 
The application of methodological individualism, homo economicus, and microeconomic theory 
allows elaboration of a simple model of individual demand and supply of one property right that 
is allocated to nature conservation. This model excludes transaction costs, and considers only 
one normal economic good – “nature conservation”. 
 
This analysis demonstrates the outcomes which can be expected when aggregating these 
individual demand and supply curves within two different organizations. A vertical aggregation 
represents the process of choice–making within politics in a direct democracy. A horizontal 
aggregation illustrates the determination of choices within a market. This analysis includes all 
possible institutional and organizational arrangements. The results reveal the quantity and 
quality of implemented nature conservation and the expected relationship between available 
and required budgets. It is highlighted how susceptible collective outcomes are to changing 
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expenditure and revenue sharing systems and voting rules. When making collective choices, 
only one revenue and expenditure sharing system exists that allows a unanimously chosen 
quantity of nature conservation. These specific sharing systems are different when considering 
different collectives.  
 
Only voluntary exchanges ensure mutual benefits and a balanced budget. I can show that the 
institution of takings increases conflicts and reduces the acceptance for implementing nature 
conservation. A preference order of the considered institutional arrangements is revealed. The 
majority of the analyzed arrangements allows unambiguous expectations on the quantity and 
quality of the implemented nature conservation.  
 
The discussion justifies the chosen economic approach for examining problems of social 
interaction within nature conservation. Furthermore, the application of the elaborated model to 
representative democratic systems is discussed. The thesis closes with examples of the current 
and expected future development in practical nature conservation. These cases are discussed in 
the light of the elaborated model and the analysis' results. 
 
The present thesis offers an explanation of past and present processes and outcomes in nature 
conservation, and a support for making expectations on the constellation of actors and their 
acceptance regarding future strategies in practical nature conservation.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Heterogeneity in Nature Conservation 
 
“Nature conservation”, including the preservation of the vague term biological diversity (Jessel 
2012: 26), is ambiguous, has different aims and various meanings (Haber 2008: 18f.). Nature 
conservation is action-oriented (Zucchi 2003: 3) and can be portrayed as a compilation of 
manifold activities (including a conscious inaction) aiming at the preservation of species, 
habitats, natural (wetlands, running waters, forests) and cultural landscapes (orchards, fallow 
grounds, unimproved grasslands), natural processes and resources (Plachter 1991: 8; Kaule 
1991; Jedicke 1994; Konold et al. 2013; Haber 2016: 129). Nature conservation comprises, 
among others, the preservation of habitats and landscapes that are either pristine (natural or 
primary habitats and landscapes) or formed by human activities over decades or centuries 
(cultural or secondary habitats or landscapes) (Eser et al. 1992: 11). Not only are the objectives 
of preservation various, but also their implementation (Schmidt 1996: 62). An area can be 
allocated solely to nature conservation (the concept of segregation) or a synergy between land 
management and nature conservation is aimed for (the concept of integration) (Jedicke 1994: 
109f.). Further, concepts in nature conservation are distinguished as either static or dynamic. 
The first preserves the state, the second allows changes. Within these two strategies, measures 
can either shield or form (Scherzinger 1990: 293). The aims and concepts or strategies for 
conserving nature are related differently to each other (Eser et al. 1992: 65; Haber 2010: 7): 
some are mutually exclusive, some bilateral promoting, and some are without mutual influence.  
 
Individuals are different. Every single individual has different preferences, aims, alternatives 
and perceptions regarding land use forms and nature conservation. Individuals own property 
rights on land and resources. These owned rights determine the constraints of individual action. 
To preserve nature, individuals have to possess the relevant property rights on the considered 
land area and resources. These rights are distributed differently among the members of our 
society and can be exchanged by them. If individuals want to preserve nature, they might have to 
exchange some property rights for obtaining the relevant property rights that are necessary for 
practicing nature conservation in return. The rules or, as I name it, institutions that structure 
and facilitate an exchange and a redistribution of property rights might be diverse.  
 
Not only do the aims of nature conservation, individual preferences, and institutions of exchange 
vary, but so does the organization of individuals. Individuals act as single persons or as a 
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collective’s member (e.g. an association). This is valid for the demand-side and the supply-side of 
nature conservation.  
 
These three highlighted aspects –individual valuation, institutions of exchange, and organization 
of demand for and supply of nature conservation – will be explained in detail in section 1.2. They 
form the basic structure for this study and lead to the object of investigation: the 
implementation of nature conservation by different individuals when different institutional and 
organizational arrangements have been chosen constitutionally. 
 
 
1.2 Economic Method for Examining Nature Conservation 
 
Nature conservation can be studied by different academic disciplines. The diversity of species 
and its influencing factors can be examined for instance from a biological perspective (see for 
instance Reif et al. 2010; Stork 1993 and 2010), an ethical (Krebs 1999; Ott 1999 and 2010; Eser 
& Potthast 1999; Jax et al. 2013) or a political one (Jordan 1999; Paavola et al. 2009; Ring & 
Schröter–Schlaack 2011). I have chosen an economic method for examining nature conservation. 
The research area of economics is defined by Homann (2002: 63) and Homann & Suchanek 
(2005: 4) as the consideration of opportunities and problems of social interaction that aims at 
mutual benefits. 
 
 
1.2.1 Individual Preferences, Values and Costs 
 
Individual objectives are different (Brennan & Buchanan 2000: 60). Individuals, regardless of 
being a landowner or not, have different preferences, perceptions and aims for using land, for 
instance for recreational or educational purposes, for timber and food production, buildings and 
nature conservation. Usually we do not know what different alternatives individuals have. There 
is no reason why these individuals should have identical alternatives. 
 
Land use forms can be mutually exclusive and conflicting (Cappelmann et al. 2010). The 
existence of different alternatives for one single individual and of different individuals who 
cannot simultaneously be implemented implies a perceived scarcity of land area (Homann & 
Suchanek 2005: 52). This scarcity is the reason for the necessity of making choices. How can 
individuals with different, conflicting perceptions of using land agree voluntarily on one land use 
form and benefit mutually?  
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While making choices, for example the choice of how to use a specific piece of land, the choice of 
one alternative implies the acceptance that the next best alternative (e.g. the right to access this 
land1, to hike or to generate income from timber production) is forgone. The value of the right to 
protect nature is measured in terms of the abandoned second-best alternative. Since individuals 
have different alternatives they abandon, they express the value of nature conservation in 
different terms 
 
Multi-dimensional illustrations in some cases might figure the term “value” better since the 
value of an increase in nature conservation can be expressed not only by one item, but by many. 
If an individual is landowner and a hunter at the same time, the right of income generation and 
the right of hunting might be influenced by the choice of increasing the nature conservation. If 
the individual chooses not to increase the area of nature conservation, his cost is the abandoned 
nature conservation. 
 
This valuation of the alternative forgone can differ between individuals (Knight 1924: 592f.) and 
is solely subjective. Even if individuals would have the same alternatives, we have no 
information how they value these alternatives. This implies that different individuals would 
abandon different alternatives in different quantities or qualities for a higher amount of nature 
conservation. The value of the forgone alternative represents the costs – or opportunity cost – of 
choosing the other alternative. Costs comprise what individuals give up when making choices.  
 
I consider two landowners with equal site productivity. The cost of an additional hectare of 
nature conservation (e.g. to set-aside one hectare of land for nature conservation purposes) is 
the lost area that could be used otherwise for production of any kind. With this, both landowners 
are confronted with the same lost alternative: a reduced hectare for production. If I add the 
condition that both landowners have different preferences, they would value the lost area for 
production differently. One of the landowners is more focused on income generation. He would 
perceive this lost hectare as high costs. The other landowner, interested in protecting meadow 
species and with a minor interested in generating income, would perceive this lost hectare of 
production as low costs. 
 
The choice for preserving biological diverse urban wasteland (Hansen et al. 2012: 18) implies 
the loss of the alternative to re-develop this area. Costs do not exist independently of the choice 
process and of the individual utility function (Buchanan 1999a: 42). The costs of more nature 
conservation might comprise – depending on the conservation aim – the abandoned right to 
                                                          
1 §59(2) BNatSchG and §28(4) SächsNatSchG 
Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation 
4 
 
hike, to ride, to observe nature, to hunt, or to produce timber. Hikers or hunters are now forced 
to move to remoter areas or have to reduce the territory on which they own the right to hike or 
hunt. Owners of local saw mills do not have the right to purchase the forest owner’s timber in 
the former quantities anymore and have to find new suppliers of timber. Therefore, costs are 
expressed in various terms as well. This does not only concern the rights connected with a 
specific protected land area, but also the property rights of adjacent areas on which projects are 
planned. For example, in Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive (HD)2, an “[…] appropriate 
assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site’s conservation objectives […]” is 
requested. 
 
The term “cost” I apply to the issue of nature conservation “[…] in a more general theory of choice 
[…]”3 (Buchanan 1999a: 41), linking cost to the act of choice. Buchanan further states that 
“Before choice, cost exists as a subjective experience. After choice, cost vanishes in this sense.” 
(Buchanan 1999a: 42). These costs are sunk (Buchanan 1999a: 45). 
Buchanan, in his introduction to the "L.S.E. Essays on Cost", lists six implications to the "choice-
bound definition of opportunity cost" (Buchanan 1981: 14): 
 
   “I.  Cost must be borne exclusively by the person who makes decisions; it is not possible for  
 this cost to be shifted to or imposed on others. 
    II. Cost is subjective; it exists only in the mind of the decision maker or chooser. 
    III. Cost is based on anticipations; it is necessarily a forward-looking or ex ante concept. 
    IV. Cost can never be realized because of the fact that choice is made; the alternative which  
 is rejected can never itself be enjoyed. 
    V. Cost cannot be measured by someone other than the chooser since there is no way that 
 subjective mental experience can be directly observed. 
    VI. Cost can be dated at the moment of final decision or choice." (Buchanan 1981: 14 & 15) 
 
Commonly, costs are expressed in pecuniary units. The reduction in the implication of practiced 
                                                          
2 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora. This directive establishes, together with the Birds Directive (Council Directive 2009/147/EC, 
the amended version of the directive 79/409/EEC), the European Union (EU) wide coherent Natura 2000 
network. This network consists of protected areas ensuring the maintenance of special habitats and 
species. 
 
3 "In any general theory of choice cost must be reckoned in a utility rather than in a commodity dimension. 
From this it follows that the opportunity cost involved in choice cannot be observed and objectified and, more 
importantly, it cannot be measured in such a way as to allow comparisons over wholly different choice 
settings." (Buchanan 1981: 15) 
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nature conservation on solely income losses of landowners (Rosenkranz et al. 2014: 212) or 
additional expenditures (Rühs & Wüstemann 2015), and with this on pecuniary units, does not 
cover or reflect the various preferences, alternatives and finally costs of individuals. As 
Buchanan4 states, costs include pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements. Buchanan’s 
understanding of “cost” widens the implications of nature conservation on individuals of a 
society that are not confronted with income losses or additional expenditures (both expressed in 
pecuniary units) but nevertheless are faced with lost alternatives that cannot be bought or sold 
(for instance, when considering German circumstances: the lost right to access forest land and to 
hike or recreate, or the additional time that is necessary to go to remoter hiking areas). With this 
perspective on costs, every supposed objectivity or external observability of costs dissolves 
when incorporating the subjective and, hence, individual determination of costs. 
 
 
1.2.2 Property Rights 
 
The individual's choice to implement nature conservation is – regardless of whether preserving 
species, processes or habitats – narrowly linked with the allocation of property rights for this 
purpose. Property rights in general can be grouped into four rights: the right to use property 
(usus), to change it (abusus), to acquire resulting gains (usus fructus), and to sell the property 
(alienation rights) (Richter & Furubotn 2003: 23; Picot et al. 2012: 57). Different individuals 
hold different bundles of property rights (Hostettler 2010: 136). In addition to that, nature 
conservation with its various aims can only be successfully implemented by individuals if they 
obtain or own the necessary property rights. Different nature conservation aims and different 
levels of strictness require different bundles of property rights. This can be deduced from the 
sections "interdictions" and "exceptions" of the decrees of protected areas (as national parks 
and protected landscapes) or when comparing the necessary property rights when preserving 
wilderness areas and orchid meadows.  
 
In the field of nature conservation, the importance of property rights on land area is emphasized 
by the most applied instrument to implement nature conservation: the legally binding 
designation of conservation areas. Wilderness areas or several species can only be protected if 
land area is provided on which other land management is abandoned and specific conservation 
measures can be implemented. 
  
                                                          
4 "The introduction of non-pecuniary advantages and disadvantages of resource uses severs the critically 
important link between the objectively measured market value of alternate product and the cost that enters 
into the subjective calculus of the decision-maker." (Buchanan 1999a: 14) 
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With the requirement of land for nature conservation, the ownership of property rights that are 
linked with this land and that entitle individuals to use the land for this purpose are meant. 
Property rights are manifold and do not belong only to landowners. According to the German 
Federal Forest Act (§14) for instance, everybody has the right to enter a forest for various 
purposes (Deegen 2012) such as hiking, cycling (Schemel & Erbguth 2000: 338), and jogging, 
regardless of owning land property or not. Further, with lease contracts, some have the right to 
hunt in the considered forest area. Some property rights, as for instance the right to acquire 
gains and to sell the property, are exclusively held by the legal landowner. 
 
The previous consideration requires that the relevant property rights are clearly determined 
and allocated. These defined rights can be exchanged and used for different purposes, one of 
them being nature conservation. According to the Coase theorem5, an unambiguous definition of 
property rights will result in an efficient outcome in the sense that the relevant property rights 
will be finally in the ownership of the individual with the highest willingness to pay (Mueller 
2003: 28; Hostettler 2010: 137). Although Coase elaborates this consideration in “The Problem of 
Social Cost” (1960), he, in the second part of this paper, includes the costs of coordination or 
transaction costs that are present at every transaction between individuals and collectives. 
Different legal regulations result in different heights of costs of coordination. 
 
 
1.2.3 Interactions 
 
1.2.3.1 Individual and Collective Exchanges 
 
The property rights that an individual or a collective holds form the constraint for the 
implementation of nature conservation. These constraints represent the border between 
alternatives or quantities that are either achievable or not. For implementing their land use 
objectives, for instance specific nature conservation aims, individuals have to own the necessary 
property rights. Either they possess them already or they have to exchange these property rights 
(voluntarily) with other individuals who presently hold them (Demsetz 1967: 147). 
 
This voluntary exchange that is based on an agreement of the interacting individuals takes place 
if it is mutual advantageous, otherwise it would fail. How much will a timber producer or farmer 
receive for ceding the right to protect several species to local nature conservationists (and with 
                                                          
5 ‘‘In the absence of transaction and bargaining costs, affected parties to an externality will agree on an 
allocation of resources that is both Pareto optimal and independent of any prior assignment of property 
rights.’’ (Mueller 2003: 28) 
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this abandoning the right to produce timber or grain) on his land? How much will a hiker receive 
for his agreement not to enter a forest (and with this abandon the right to enter a forest) that 
shall be protected as wilderness area? If no mutual benefits evolve, individuals would not agree 
voluntarily on one and the same land use form. 
 
Social interactions – including exchanges – that aim at resolving land use conflicts take place 
within different organizational arrangements: (1) between single individuals, (2) between 
collectives (Coleman 1974: 759/760), and (3) between a combination of the first and the second. 
In the first case, which is called a market exchange, choices are made individually and single 
individuals interact. In the second case, which is called a political exchange, choices are made 
collectively and collectives interact (Buchanan 1968: 1 and 186). In the third case, market and 
politics are entangled (Wagner 2010: 163) since choices are made individually and collectively 
and an individual interacts with a collective. 
 
 
1.2.3.2 Demand and Supply 
 
“Nature conservation” and with this the bundle of rights to protect nature is used to satisfy the 
needs of humans, for example the need to maintain or restore species, habitats and so forth. 
Since individuals are aware of this linkage and since individuals have the disposal to use “nature 
conservation” for realizing their needs, the right to implement nature conservation can be 
regarded as an economic good (Menger 1871: 3). 
 
When goods are exchanged via markets, the analysis of or the division in a demand-side and a 
supply-side is common practice. One individual wants a good (e.g. for consumption) and another 
one supplies it (produces it or provides it). Usually the demander and the supplier are different 
individuals, except in the case of a subsistence economy. 
 
This structure of exchange is also applicable to collective choices and with this to political 
organizations (Buchanan 1968: 1). Goods such as culture, health, public transport, 
kindergartens, schools, and nature conservation do not exist for no particular reason, but 
because individuals as members of a collective demand them and individuals as members of the 
same or a different collective supply them. A collective can as well desire/demand a good and a 
collective can as well supply a good.  
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Which of these two organizations will be used to exchange goods is not predetermined, but 
rather a choice made by humans that find it advantageous (Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 44) to use 
the first or the second organization, or a combination of both (Buchanan 1965: 4; Tullock 1969: 
190; Blankart 2006: 73ff.). Regardless of which organization has been chosen by the individuals 
of a society, the smallest observable unit is the single human being (Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 
XVI). Therefore, all considerations must be related to the individual. The center of my analysis is 
the rational choosing individual. With this I apply methodological individualism (Blankart 2006: 
12) and the concept of homo economicus in a democratic society (Jensen & Meckling 1994; 
Homan & Suchanek 2005: 364; Kirchgässner 2008: 12). 
 
In addition to this, I assume that individuals make choices, independent of being within the first 
and the second described organization, based on the same patterns: they are self-interested, try 
to maximize their utility and always choose the alternative that implies the highest net benefit. 
With this, the same behavior that is assumed in market exchanges is applied to political 
exchanges. And exactly this is the essence of public choice as a research program (Buchanan 
2003: 13) that considers the “pitfalls” (Yandle 1999: 23) when collective choices are made. 
Mueller (2003: 1) described it in the following way:  
 
"Public choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or 
simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter of public 
choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voter 
behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice 
is that of economics, however."  
 
 
1.3 Object of Study 
 
1.3.1 Observed Failure to Meet Targets, Dissatisfaction and Implementation Deficits 
 
The designation of conservation areas, combined with a diversity of funding opportunities on 
the national and supranational stage, did not succeed in sufficient attainment of the objectives of 
the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (for instance the reduction in the threat of species and the 
improvement and protection of the conservation status of habitats). Partially, an opposite 
development can be reported on a national (BfN 2014b; BMUB 2015a) and supranational stage 
(Pe'er et al. 2014; EC 2015c). Based on this development, a reconsideration of the current nature 
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conservation policy is demanded (TAB 2014: 9ff.) that includes a reduction in command and 
control measures and an increase in voluntary agreements. 
 
Examining the field of nature conservation, an omnipresent dissatisfaction of society's members 
can be observed (Marshall et al. 2007; Cappelmann et al. 2010). This was the starting point for 
my research.  
 
Conflicts and missing local acceptance are reported with regard to the designation of protected 
areas in general (Stoll-Kleemann 2001a and 2001b; Ruschkowski & Mayer 2011), to the amount 
and consequences of wilderness areas (Höchtl et al. 2005) that shall be implemented according 
to the German National Strategy on Biological Diversity, and to national parks (Jessel 2016: 7; 
Frohn et al. 2017). Obviously, the aim of social interaction – a mutual benefit – is not met.  
 
Furthermore, I refer to the studies published by Jordan (1999), Ledoux et al. (2000), Weber et al. 
(2000), Wagner (2002), Weber & Christophersen (2002), Sauer et al. (2005), Grodzinska–
Jurczak & Cent (2011) that examine the acceptance of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) that 
have been designated according to the HD and the implementation process of this European 
Directive. It is remarkable that dissatisfaction can be found among land owners and as well as 
among individuals who are responsible for the implementation of conservation aims (Sauer et 
al. 2005; CEPF 2012).  
 
 
1.3.2 Observed Organization of Demand for Nature Conservation 
 
I assume that both individual and collective demand for nature conservation is present in 
practical nature conservation. Observations of past and present proceedings of protecting 
nature reveal that politically organized exchange, and with this collective choices within our 
representative democratic society, are of considerable importance for implementing nature 
conservation. Collective and democratic choices, made by more than one individual or by 
representatives of a collective (as elected members of parliament or not elected members of the 
administrative system), are omnipresent, dominating, and attract most attention for solving 
conflicts in the field of nature conservation. This observation is supported by the following 
arguments: 
 
(1) Many nature conservation organizations, such as the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation 
Union (NABU), Greenpeace, Robin Wood and so forth claim, actively support and implement 
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nature conservation. Further, these associations purchase land for the purpose of 
implementing their preferred conservation aims (for instance Grüne Liga Sachsen e.V. and 
Landesverein Sächsischer Heimatschutz e.V.). 
 
(2) Parliament, as a collective of elected representatives of the entirety of individuals, living in 
the considered municipalities, Laender, states or union of states, demands the good "nature 
conservation". The diversity of legally binding regulations and funding guidelines on the 
supranational, national and Laender stage that contain, support and determine conservation 
aims is passed by these representatives of our democratic society. Exemplarily the HD, 
nature conservation acts, hunting acts, and the LIFE Programme can be listed. 
 
(3) Further, the administrative system (for instance nature conservation authorities, forest and 
agricultural administrations) is responsible for transposing these regulations and funding 
guidelines (Eser 1999: 108; Hampicke 1991: 13; Hampicke 2013: 233). These bureaucrats 
are non-elected representatives of a collective (Tullock 1971) that are responsible for the 
practical implementation of those regulations that have been passed by parliament. 
 
 
1.3.3 Observed Organization of Supply of Nature Conservation 
 
Nature conservation is implemented and, with this, supplied individually and collectively. The 
fact that both organizational arrangements can be found is obvious when exemplarily 
considering the ownership structure of conservation areas that are partially or completely 
located in forests. The relevance of the ecosystem “forest” for nature conservation is highlighted 
by Schmidt (2007: 14ff.), Winkel et al. (2005: 51) and the European Commission (EC; 2015a: 
34). According to Polley (2009: 76), 6% of German forest area is protected with the category 
“nature conservation area”. This amounts to an area of 664,547.94 hectares (distributed on 
different types of forest land property), representing circa 52% of the total area protected with 
the category “nature conservation area”. To apply another example, 24% of the total German 
forest area is located in sites contributing to the Natura 2000 network (including SACs and 
Special Protected Areas (SPAs)) (Polley 2009: 76). The part that is designated according to the 
guidelines of the HD amounts to 19% (Sippel 2007 cited in Entenmann & Schaich 2014: 7). 
Sippel (2007: 13) and Rosenkranz et al. (2012: 22) gathered the distribution of SACs on different 
types of forest property throughout Germany. According to them, 46% of the area of designated 
SACs is located on state forest land, ranging from 30% in Baden–Wuerttemberg to 75% in 
Saarland. A share of 28% of total SACs is designated on privately owned forest land, ranging 
from 10% in Saarland to 59% in Brandenburg. The area of communal forest land designated as 
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SACs amounts to 18% (ranging from 3% in Lower Saxony to 47% in Baden–Wuerttemberg). As 
identified by Rosenkranz et al. (2012), the designated sites reflect the diverse forest ownership 
structure of Germany. 
 
Nature conservation is, as Polley (2009: 77) shows for German forest land, considerably 
implemented on state-owned land and with this on land that is basically owned by all the 
citizens of (1) the Laender – if state forests of the Laender are considered, or (2) of Germany – if 
the federal state forests are regarded, or (3) municipalities – if communal forests are observed. If 
this state-owned land is managed by bureaucrats, the administrative organization is not only a 
demander but also a supplier. Further, nature conservation activities are observable on private 
forest land. The term "private forests" (§3 BWaldG) does not imply that this land area is solely 
owned by single individuals, but also by associations or families. With this, the term “private 
forest land” does not imply that choices on land use are always made individually, but can be 
rather made collectively as well.  
 
 
1.3.4 Observed Exchanges of Nature Conservation 
 
Voluntary supply implies that individuals which hold the necessary property rights choose (1) to 
implement several conservation aims on their own, or (2) to exchange them with other 
individuals or collectives that are interested in implementing conservation aims. For ceding 
these property rights they receive other rights in return, voluntarily paid by the trading partner. 
 
But, by including the observed dissatisfaction in my consideration, the structure of voluntary 
exchange appears invalid for some of the various exchanges in practical nature conservation. I 
observe that mutual beneficiary exchanges of property rights are not the only institution of 
interaction. Coercion in the form of exogenously determined payments and quantities is applied 
to implement nature conservation. Individually or collectively owned property rights are either 
confiscated and takings are applied, or property rights are dispossessed and compensation is 
paid. If “eminent domains” are applied, compensation is paid. This might be in the form of 
funding guidelines; based on these guidelines, exogenously determined compensation is paid in 
monetary terms to land owners. This compensation cover (if at all) the monetary part of the 
occurring subjective costs that are implied by nature conservation activities and measures.  
 
With the term “taking” or “confiscation”, I understand the removing of individual rights that are 
owned by the individuals of a society. The right to dispose of their own money, the right to 
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manage land property (for example the choice of tree species6, the amount of coarse woody 
habitats7 and the extension8 or reduction9 of the harvesting period (see also Schmack et al. 2013: 
41)), or the right to enter a forest area according to his own perceptions is taken without 
receiving property rights in return. This kind of exchange takes place involuntarily by coercing 
the owner of the property right to cede it. 
 
Despite the various conservation measures, concepts and strategies, the mainly applied 
institution to implement the conservation of nature is that of takings, or as Kirchgässner & 
Schneider (2003) named it, that of command and control. This includes the designation of 
conservation areas. In The Hague in 2002 for instance, the Conference of the Parties agreed "[…] 
to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity loss." (The 2010 
Biodiversity Target). That is, among others, clarified by Goal 1 that determines the promotion of 
"[…] the conservation of the biological diversity of ecosystems, habitats and biomes […]" (SCBDa). 
This shall be reached with the sub-target 1.1, which presets the conservation of "[…] at least 10% 
of the world's ecological regions effectively […]" (SCBDb). Further evidence can be obtained by the 
consideration of the various systems and categories of protected areas that exist, based on 
legally binding and non-binding instruments: the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) names seven categories, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act lists different 
parts of nature and landscape to be protected for different purposes (§§ 23 – 30), the HD was 
enacted with the aim of designating SACs, and finally the German National Strategy on Biological 
Diversity aims to increase the number of wilderness areas (BMUB 2015b). 
 
The removed property rights do not disappear but are transferred either to another individual 
or to all the members or representatives (elected or not) of a collective, including the previous 
owner. In the last case, not one individual (the owner) decides the manner of land management, 
but the whole collective of n members. The right to manage the own property is now no longer 
individually owned, but of a collective kind: the whole collective – with each member having one 
vote and all votes having the same influence – chooses in a democratic process the way of 
management, access and so forth. Either bureaucrats have the power to allow exceptions, or 
parliament can choose to change regulations that imply confiscations or eminent domains.  
The illustration of the observations in chapters 1.3.1 to 1.3.4 lead to the following stylized facts 
that form the fundament for the structure of the analysis in chapter 3: 
  
                                                          
6 MaP 290 "Göltzschtal", Saxony 
7 MaP 8411-341 "Forests near Whylen", Baden–Wuerttemberg 
8 MaP 295 "Beech Forest around Klingenthal", Saxony 
9 MaP 8317-341 "Forest, Meadows and Wetlands near Jestetten", Baden–Wuerttemberg 
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Fact 1: 
Nature conservation is demanded mainly collectively. Individual demand may exist, but is of 
minor importance. 
 
Fact 2: 
Practical nature conservation is supplied either individually or collectively. 
 
Although the facts 1 and 2 are obvious, they structure the observed demand for and supply of the 
good “nature conservation” and indicate the consequences for the decision-making processes 
regarding the demanded and supplied quantity and the financing rules. 
 
Fact 3: 
Exchanges of nature conservation are not only voluntary. Deviating institutions as eminent 
domain and confiscation are present.  
 
 
1.4 Aims and Research Question 
 
The applied method of this research is deduction. The aim of this dissertation is the analysis of 
the coordination of the demand for and the supply of the good "nature conservation" within a 
direct democracy. With the application of microeconomic theory, I will deduce the consequences 
on the quantity and quality of the implementation of nature conservation, which can be 
generally expected by the exogenously imposed institutional and organizational arrangements. I 
understand the term "democratic" as equal treatment of each individual choice and as an 
aggregation of individual choices to a collective outcome based on the application of different 
decision-making rules. The same individual behavior is supposed, regardless of acting 
individually or within collectives. The rational choosing individual is the center of this study. 
With this, the collective is not studied as one single individual but as a group of many (different) 
individuals. The term “direct” describes the assumption that those who govern are identical to 
those who are governed. Collective choices are made directly by the collective’s members and 
the right to choose is not transferred to one or some individuals which represent the collective. 
 
The first part of my analysis considers the sub-constitutional level since the individuals of the 
collective do not choose the arrangements but rather accept their existence. When analyzing the 
different common institutional and organizational arrangements, the resulting implications of 
the following most relevant combinations in practical nature conservation will be shown:  
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 Voluntary collective demand and voluntary individual supply. 
 Voluntary collective demand and voluntary collective supply. 
 Collective demand and individual supply with exogenously determined payments or 
quantities. 
 Collective demand and collective supply with exogenously determined payments or 
quantities. 
 
Demanders and suppliers can be different collectives, but do not have to be. The supplying 
collective can be identical to or a subset of the demanding one. 
 
The individual balances the advantages against the disadvantages of every arrangement. The 
different institutional and organizational arrangements allow a comparison that is based on 
individual considerations. With this, as the second aim of this dissertation, propositions 
regarding the constitutional choice of certain institutional arrangements made by different 
individuals can be deduced, as Buchanan and Tullock (1975) do for the choice between direct 
control and penalty taxes for reducing pollution problems. 
 
 
1.5 Differentiation to other Studies 
 
Economics as a scientific discipline offers many theories that can be applied to analyze the 
interaction of individuals for implementing nature conservation. To categorize the present study 
into the economic canon, I first highlight that I apply an individual perspective for analyzing the 
demand and supply of nature conservation. This distinguishes the present study from the 
tradition of welfare economics, which focuses on an aggregated perspective of the whole society. 
 
Furthermore, I differentiate the terms collective (public) and individual (private) goods. For this, 
I do not apply the standard Samuelson criteria of non-rivalry and excludability (Samuelson 
1954: 387 and Samuelson 1955: 350) and group goods into private goods and public goods, but I 
refer to Buchanan (1968:1): according to him, private or individual goods are demanded and 
supplied via markets and public or collective goods via politics (see as well section 1.2.3.1). He 
distinguishes goods in private and public, whereas he understands goods as “public” “[…] in the 
sense that all members of the interacting group must adjust to the same quantity of each good.” 
(Buchanan 1968: 101). The applied differentiation implies that not characteristics of the 
considered good (non-rivalry and excludability) are relevant for a subsequent analysis of 
demand and supply (see for instance Demsetz 1970; Pommerehne 1994), but the different 
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organization of decision-making processes – namely the difference in generating an individual 
or a collective outcome. To avoid confusion, I do not use the terms “private” or “public” but 
“individual” and “collective” instead.  
 
In this study I examine the demand and supply of the good "nature conservation" when different 
organizational and institutional arrangements have been chosen. Elinor Ostrom (2010) focuses 
on her decades of research on goods that are rivalrous and non-excludable – the common-pool 
resources, for instance irrigation. Although she applies Samuelson's classification of goods and 
not Buchanan's one, the subsequent analysis of different institutional arrangements may 
represent a linkage to her comprehensive work. She elaborates a diversity of institutional 
arrangements to use common-pool resources sustainably without overuse and destruction by 
local collectives. Aligica (2010: 95) highlights and summarizes two theses of her research:  
 
"Firstly, any single, comprehensive set of formal laws intended to govern a large 
expanse of territory containing diverse ecological niches is bound to fail. Secondly, 
improving the abilities of those directly engaged in the particulars of their local 
conditions to organise themselves is potentially a better strategy than attempting to 
implement idealised, theoretically optimal institutional arrangements."  
 
Whether the good “nature conservation” is demanded and supplied individually and/or 
collectively cannot result in a comparison of efficiency between public and private production, 
as done for instance by Stiglitz (1974) for education and by Pommerehne (1976 and 1983) and 
Bennett & Johnson (1979) for waste collection. The public sector is an example of a collective, 
but collective choices can be found as well in the private sector, for instance if an enterprise 
consists of more than one decision-making individual. 
 
The fact that I apply economics as an approach in the understanding of Homann & Suchanek 
(2005: 4) differentiates the present dissertation from studies that focus on asset and income 
losses and additional expenditures caused by nature conservation activities (see for instance 
Volz 1992; Main et al. 1999; Rosenkranz et al. 2014; Grunewald et al. 2014). Irene Ring 
emphasizes (Ring 2001) and models (Ring 2008) the integration of ecological issues into the 
fiscal equalization of municipalities for compensating expenditures on nature conservation. In 
addition to that, this thesis does not examine possibilities to market for instance forest products 
(Mantau et. al 2001 and 2007) or ecosystem services and does not quantify their values, as done 
by the global and national initiative on “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” (TEEB). 
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1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The basis of my dissertation is to accept that different perceptions exist on land use, as 
described earlier. In the current work, I will follow this methodology and do not (and further I 
simply cannot) make any statement of what should be right or wrong (Buchanan 2000: 3). 
 
The introduced general models of individual demand for and individual supply of nature 
conservation in chapter 2 are based on microeconomic theory and Buchanan's understanding of 
the term "cost". With this, I do not specify the individual nature conservation aims or individual 
costs.  
 
Chapter 3 continues with a comprehensive analysis of two organizational arrangements 
(aggregation within markets or politics) and three different but common institutional 
arrangements: voluntary exchange, confiscation and takings, and eminent domain and 
compensation.  
 
Chapter 4 offers a discussion that covers a comparison with further scientific contributions, 
includes decision-making costs, and transfers the findings to representative democracies. 
Further on, examples of the analyzed cases and a conclusion are given.  
 
This dissertation offers an alternative view on the implementation of nature conservation in 
democratic societies. The aim is to elaborate convenient, basic and simple models that describe 
the observed implementation of nature conservation that results from collective choices. This 
broadens the understanding of the influences of nature conservation, which is commonly 
reduced to income losses or higher expenditures by landowners. At the same time, this 
broadening is the starting point for the application of Buchanan's public choice analysis on 
nature conservation.  
 
A basic and positive discussion will be initiated, which will explain and qualify the observed 
dissatisfaction linked with the present demand and supply of nature conservation. As a result, 
recommendations for the organization of nature conservation can be given that are consistent 
with the observed democratic processes and with the applied institutions.  
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2 Model 
 
When individuals implement the good “nature conservation”, they abandon the right of an 
alternative use since they allocate property rights for the purpose of nature conservation. For a 
higher amount of deadwood, individuals abandon the right of determining shorter harvest ages 
and the right to sell this timber and to generate income. The preservation of threatened species 
requires a reduced or limited stream of visitors10 that includes the abandonment of taking 
photos of rare species (Hampicke 1991: 111) and a resulting reduced enjoyment for some 
society’s members. For allowing natural processes, hunting is limited11 or the quantity of hiking 
paths can be reduced (LfUG 2007: 200). 
 
How much of their total bundle of property rights will individuals allocate to nature 
conservation or exchange for additional "property rights for nature conservation"? They can 
exchange their owned property rights for receiving "property rights for nature conservation" or 
they abandon their "property rights for choosing another alternative (to sell timber or to access 
a specific land area)" for the purpose of nature conservation and receive other property rights as 
revenues in return. Individuals who choose the first way are called demanders, those who prefer 
the second way are suppliers. Besides these possibilities of realizing nature conservation, 
individuals can be demander and supplier at the same time. Whether they choose to be a 
demander or a supplier of nature conservation depends on the height of payments (in terms of 
property rights) they will receive or have to make and their individual valuation. 
 
As Shogren et al. (1999: 1259f.) summarizes that nature conservation, like every economic good, 
is demanded based on economic variable such as wealth or land price. It is supplied based on 
incentives. Opportunity costs are included in the decision-making processes. Montgomery 
(1995) points out the application of marginal choices while providing nature conservation, by 
examining the case of the Northern Spotted Owl (a species listed as threatened in July 1990 
according to the Endangered Species Act (enacted by the United States Congress in 1973)). Its 
implementation is no all-or-nothing choice, but a marginal one.   
                                                          
10 The act for the designation of a zone for protecting a bird species that is located in the nature 
conservation area "Saale-Elster-Aue bei Halle" prohibits the access of the designated area between January 
1st and July 31st each year (§4) (LVWA 2003). 
 
11 The act for the designation of the National Park “Saxon Switzerland”, annex 5 (SMUL 2003). 
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The model that I will apply for analyzing the exchange of property rights, which are relevant for 
implementing nature conservation, contains two parts. They allow construction of an 
individual's demand curve D and an individual's supply curve S, for every individual of a society 
that holds or exchanges property rights on land. With this, the model does not have a limited 
application to legal landowners. 
 
Additionally, I would like to point out that nature conservation is modeled as a normal good 
(Mankiw 2001: 473). The income effect and the substitution effect have equal directions and 
lead to a decreased demand for nature conservation when payments for receiving the good 
"nature conservation" rise. In fact, an examination of an opposed influence of both effects on the 
demanded quantity of nature conservation (nature conservation would be modeled as an 
inferior good) with a dominating or non-dominating income effect represents an issue for 
further research. 
 
 
2.1 The Individual Demand Curve D 
 
Individuals might be interested in conservation measures for obtaining the satisfaction that 
species, habitats or processes continue to exist (Duerr 1993: 104; Krutilla 1967: 779). The value 
of the continuing existence and the enhancement of biodiversity cannot only be captured by the 
number of different species, habitats, processes, or genetic resources, but rather by the number 
of different combinations of specific characteristics that is represented by the considered set of 
species or habitats (Nehring & Puppe 2002). 
 
Demand curves illustrate the individually desired quantity or quality of a good in relation to 
different heights of costs which need to be paid for obtaining the considered good (Mankiw 
2001: 70). How much of one "property right allocated to nature conservation" will an individual 
additionally demand and receive when he has to pay or give away a specific amount of another 
property right? 
 
The derivation of an individual's demand curve requires determinants which the demand is 
dependent on (Mankiw 2001: 67ff.): 
 
𝐷 = 𝐷(𝑐𝐷(𝑠, 𝑞), 𝑣𝑁𝐶) 
𝐷 = 𝐷(𝑐𝐷(𝑠, 𝑎), 𝑣𝑁𝐶) 
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cD Costs of nature conservation as a function of: 
s Strictness of conservation aims 
q Seize of the bundle of property rights 
a Productivity 
vNC Individual valuation of nature conservation 
 
 
2.1.1 Costs of Nature Conservation cD 
 
Costs cD represent the subjective valuation of abandoned property rights. For receiving the right 
of conserving nature, the individual abandons the right to choose an alternative use. Costs of 
nature conservation cD are a function of the following variables: 
 The strictness of conservation aims s. 
 The size of the bundle of property rights the individual holds q. 
 The productivity a of owned relevant property rights that results in different heights of 
generated income. 
 
 
2.1.1.1 Strictness of Conservation Aims s 
 
When I observe the different categories of conservation, it would be a very limited perspective 
to assume that owners of forest or agricultural land, while choosing between either to practice 
nature conservation or to produce timber, abandon generally on a fixed amount of income per 
hectare. This would imply that "nature conservation" is understood as a homogeneous good that 
influences possibilities of income generation and land use always in the same manner. But I 
observe that different conservation aims influence management practices and alternative land 
use forms variously. This becomes obvious when comparing the effect of the preservation of one 
hectare of deadwood (or preservation of natural processes), of one hectare of mountain forest 
(e.g. Vaccinio-Abietum) in the Ore Mountains, or of certain species on the amount of abandoned 
property rights. 
 
According to different conservation categories (§§ 23 – 30 BNatSchG) and with these different 
degrees of strictness, the individuals have to abandon a different number of property rights: 
only the management right or the management right and the hunting right or the management 
right, the hunting right and the access right together. The conservation categories “national 
parks” (§24 BNatSchG) and “protected landscape” (§26 BNatSchG) give an impressive example 
of the variety of conservation aim’s influence on other (previous) land use alternatives.  
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2.1.1.2 Size of the Bundle of Property Rights q 
 
Assuming now three individuals with differently-sized bundles of property rights, for instance 
different heights of total assets, but equal preference patterns regarding nature conservation 
and equal heights of generated income per hectare (equal productivity). The size of land 
property, the hunting area, the area that is used for recreational purposes (for instance the 
number of beaches of a lake or the density of hiking paths) varies. The different amount of 
generated income (height of monetary income or hunting bag) is reasoned in the different size of 
land property, keeping the productivity unchanged. The demand curves DL, DM and DH of these 
three individuals are illustrated in figure 2.1 with: 
 
DL=Small bundle of property rights. 
DM=Medium bundle of property rights. 
DH=Large bundle of property rights. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Demand for Nature Conservation [ha] 
 
 
Keeping the payments for an additional hectare of nature conservation unchanged, the larger the 
bundle of property rights an individual owns and uses (for instance the number of lakes, the 
hiking area or the game population), the more nature conservation the individual will demand. 
The number of lakes, the game population and the number of hiking paths per hectare remains 
unchanged. 
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This relationship is already elaborated by Fischel (1979: 115) and Kahn & Matsusaka (1997: 
167)12. Nelson et al. (2007: 592) state that "[…] it is also clear that open space preservation is 
largely the domain of richer, more economically-secure, more educated, and more environmentally-
concerned communities". According to this, a positive dependency exists between the size of the 
bundle of property rights (the total assets) and the demanded amount of land on which one 
property right is allocated to nature conservation.  
 
 
2.1.1.3 Productivity a  
 
In section 2.1.1.2 I considered the influence of the total size of the bundle of property rights – the 
total assets – on the demand for nature conservation. I varied the size of the bundle of property 
rights and kept the productivity unchanged. 
 
Even if individuals have the same size of bundles of property rights (the same height of total 
assets) at their disposal, they can generate different heights of income with particular property 
rights.  
 
I consider two individuals with equal preferences that have the same bundle of property rights, 
but generate different heights of income from timber or grain production or different hunting 
success. The reasons for this are varying site productivities, different timber and grain prices, or 
different game densities. The land property size remains unchanged. 
 
The cost for additional nature conservation is the abandoned income per hectare that is 
generated by the land property. The consequence is that the individual with a lower productivity 
of forest or agricultural land is confronted with lower costs for an additional area of nature 
conservation, ceteris paribus. 
 
When applying one category of nature conservation, the individual with the lower productivity 
of forest land or lower hunting success would demand more nature conservation compared to 
the one with higher income and higher hunting success, ceteris paribus. The costs for an 
additional hectare of nature conservation area are lower for the individual with the lower 
generated income, lower site productivity, or smaller hunting success.  
  
                                                          
12 Thalmann (2004) in contrast found no relationship between income and collective demand for 
environmental protection. 
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This is also applicable to recreational purposes: the individual costs for an additional hectare of 
nature conservation are larger for a land area that is intensively used for recreational purposes 
(hiking, swimming, horse riding and skiing) than for areas that are less the destination of a 
recreationist. 
 
 
2.1.1.4 Explanation of the Following Figures 
 
The previously introduced variables determine the costs of nature conservation within the 
demand function. The strictness of nature conservation s describes the number of different 
property rights that are allocated to nature conservation per hectare. The seize of the bundle of 
property rights q and the productivity a picture the number of hectares on which one single 
property right is allocated to nature conservation. A careful interpretation of the following 
figures is necessary, as is explained below. 
 
As shown earlier, individuals own different property rights they can allocate to and exchange for 
nature conservation and nature conservation affects different property rights in return. 
Nevertheless, I will restrict the following description of the model and the subsequent analysis 
to an exchange of two property rights. With this I assume that supplying (demanding) 
individuals allocate (receive) a specific amount of one property right (expressed in land area 
[ha]) for nature conservation purposes and receive (pay) an amount of one property right as 
payments (e.g. money or the right to collect a specific amount of fuelwood in another forest) 
(expressed per hectare) for each hectare of nature conservation in return. The following figures 
are generalized and do not specify property rights (see the generalization in figure 2.2). This 
reduction implies that s is kept constant: one property right per hectare is allocated to nature 
conservation. 
 
This reduction on the area allocated to nature conservation is reasoned in the fact that the 
subsequent figures will be two-dimensional. Nevertheless, this two-dimensionality suffices to 
illustrate the structure of the exchange of property rights between demanders and suppliers. 
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Figure 2.2: Specified (Left) and Generalized Illustration (Right) 
 
 
Obviously, as already explained in section 1.2.1, an extension to a multi-dimensional figure would 
offer the possibility to picture the different property rights that might be exchanged for the 
purpose of nature conservation simultaneously by one individual.  
 
Another fact that supports the applied reduction is that the whole bundle of property rights an 
individual owns cannot be pictured by one axis while the diagram illustrates the graphs of three 
individuals at the same time. This imagined figure would assume that the preference order of 
the single property rights of the total bundle is identical among the three different individuals: 
all of them would prefer the access right before the hunting right before the right to collect 
mushrooms and so forth. This approach would represent another very limiting reduction.  
 
Reasoned in this limitation, the strictness of nature conservation is not modeled as an 
endogenous factor, but as an exogenous one. The endogenous variable in the described model is 
the area of nature conservation. But exactly the choice of another endogenous variable for 
describing nature conservation would again represent a starting point for further research that 
examines the demand for and supply of different strictness of nature conservation. 
 
 
2.1.2 Individual Valuation of Nature Conservation vNC 
 
If individuals have the same preferences, the same bundle of property rights and the same 
productivity of the owned property rights, they would have the same demand curve for property 
rights for nature conservation. Different preferences and with this valuation schemes of nature 
conservation obviously result in different demand curves, ceteris paribus. The demand curves DL, 
DM and DH in figure 2.1 illustrate further three individuals with different preferences vNC but 
equally-seized bundles of property rights and equal productivity:  
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DL=Low interest in nature conservation. 
DM=Medium interest in nature conservation. 
DH=High interest in nature conservation. 
 
 
2.1.3 Hypotheses for the Individual Demand for Nature Conservation 
 
I model "nature conservation" with the relevant, associated property rights as a normal 
economic good (Kahn & Matsusaka 1997: 14013; Rothenberg 2002: 5; Mankiw 2001: 473). The 
income effect and the substitution effect have an equal direction. Increasing costs imply a 
decrease in the demanded quantity of relevant property rights for nature conservation. This 
relationship allows the formulation of the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Stricter nature conservation requires more different property rights and implies higher costs. 
Less strict nature conservation implies lower costs and needs fewer different property rights. 
Therefore, the demand for less strict nature conservation is higher than the demand for stricter 
nature conservation aims, ceteris paribus. 
 
This hypothesis implies that demand for an increase in tree species diversity is larger than 
demand for wilderness areas. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The larger the land area individuals own (and with this the larger the bundle of property rights 
they hold), the larger the demand for nature conservation, ceteris paribus. 
 
This second hypothesis results in a higher demand for nature conservation by individuals with 
larger properties, larger number of beaches per lake, larger hiking areas compared to 
individuals with smaller properties, smaller number of beaches per lake, and smaller hiking 
areas, ceteris paribus. 
  
                                                          
13 To be more precise, Kahn & Matsusaka (1997: 140) found that the environment is a normal good at 
mean income level and an inferior good at the highest income levels (especially when parklands are 
considered). 
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Hypothesis 3: 
More nature conservation is demanded by individuals whose relevant property rights (for 
instance generating income, hunting, recreation), which they have to pay or give away, have a 
lower productivity, ceteris paribus. 
 
As an implication of hypothesis 3, more nature conservation is demanded by owners of forest 
and agricultural land with low site productivities, by owners of timber stands with low net 
present values, by hunters on land area with low game densities, or by individuals who make 
little use of land area for recreational purposes. Landowners with a low productivity of timber 
production would demand more nature conservation than those landowners with a high 
productivity of timber production, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
As a combination of hypotheses 2 and 3, I conclude that individuals with larger, not necessarily 
diversified, bundles of property rights (reasoned in the owned seize of land area) but lower 
productivity will demand more nature conservation than individuals with small property rights 
and high productivity. The larger the land property and the lower the site productivity, the more 
nature conservation individuals demand, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
2.2 The Individual Supply Curve S 
 
Supply curves illustrate the quantity or quality of a good an individual is willing to provide when 
receiving different heights of payments in return. The quantity of the good "nature conservation 
area" an individual is willing to supply S is determined by the following variables: 
 
𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑐𝑆(𝑠, 𝑞), 𝑝𝑆) 
𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑐𝑆(𝑠, 𝑎), 𝑝𝑆) 
 
cS Costs of supplying nature conservation as a function of: 
s Strictness of conservation aims 
q Size of bundles of property rights 
a Productivity 
pS Individual valuation of received payments 
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2.2.1 Costs of Supplying Nature Conservation cS 
 
The “theory of production” usually illustrates the derivation of supply curves on the basis of a 
production function and of means of production or inputs (Samuelson & Nordhaus 1995: 106ff.; 
Mankiw 2001: 273; Besanko & Braeutigam 2005: 159; Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2005: 219ff.), by 
using Dollars or Euros as units for fixed, variable, total, and marginal costs to illustrate the 
money that flows. Solely objective costs are included in the illustration14.  
 
With the consideration of (1) Buchanan’s understanding of costs as lost opportunities (1999a: 
43ff.), (2) the subjectivity of lost alternatives, and (3) the property rights approach, this common 
depiction of costs can be understood in the following way: the means of production that are 
relevant for supplying nature conservation are the property rights which the supplying 
individuals abandon. These property rights that are used or ceded for producing or providing 
goods as “nature conservation” cannot be used for other alternatives any longer (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus 1995: 119ff.; Mankiw 2001: 271; Besanko & Braeutigam 2005: 187; Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld 2005: 214). With this, the supplier abandons the alternative he could have enjoyed if 
he had not quit the right of timber harvesting or hunting for nature conservation purposes. 
Landowners that supply nature conservation abandon the right to generate gains from timber 
management or other land use forms as agriculture. Money that is used for implementing nature 
conservation measures (e.g. for planting hedges, installing nesting boxes) is not available for 
other purposes. Non-landowners cede the right to hike, to recreate, to collect mushrooms or to 
observe species. The individual valuation of the abandoned alternatives are the subjective costs 
of providing nature conservation the supplier is confronted with.  
 
This chain of thought helps to derive an individual’s supply curve for the conscious provision of 
nature conservation15. I understand supply as an exchange between payments the owners of 
property rights receive for providing nature conservation. These are payments for the 
abandonment of the alternative the supplier could have chosen instead. Individuals value the 
exchange between received payments and nature conservation differently – in the same way as 
they do in choosing the individual demand. On the demand side, the individual's question is: 
                                                          
14 "Cost in the predictive models of economic must be objective. If cost is introduced into a logic of choice, 
however, it is obviously subjective." (Buchanan 1999a: 45) 
 
15 In the past, habitats or landscapes that are nowadays valuable from the biodiversity point of view, 
developed as a result of managing land (hedges, orchid meadows, coppice forests, pastoral forests (Gerken 
et al. 2008: 24 & 109)). Since these areas evolved either as joint products or as a result of abandonment of 
non-efficient land management, a difference exists to the above considered case of a conscious provision 
of nature conservation that excludes an alternative land use. 
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“How much would I abandon for obtaining one additional hectare of nature conservation?” The 
question on the supply side is “How much do I have to receive for voluntarily providing an 
additional hectare of nature conservation?” On both sides, individuals compare the value of the 
property right they receive with the value of the right they have to abandon. It becomes 
apparent that the individual’s valuation of the exchanged quantities plays the central role in 
making choices – regardless of choosing demand or supply. In both exchanges, the right of 
nature conservation is exchanged with a property right that the individual pays or receives; only 
the direction of transaction is reversed.  
 
 
2.2.1.1 Determinants of the Costs of Supplying Nature Conservation cS 
 
According to the concept of decreasing marginal utility (Mankiw 2001: 447), the last hectare 
used for timber production (and with this for income generation or hiking and recreation 
spends) the smallest marginal utility. When the individual chooses to allocate one specific 
property right of his whole bundle to nature conservation, he abandons the marginal utility of an 
alternative use. The marginal utility the individual abandons becomes larger with every increase 
in the area on which the relevant property right cannot be allocated to the alternative use.  
 
In the same way as the demand-determining costs are defined, supply-determining costs are 
influenced by the following variables:  
 The strictness of nature conservation s. 
 The size of the bundle of property rights the individual holds q. 
 The productivity a. 
 
The height of the total individual utility that can be spent by property rights and with this the 
amount of utility the individual abandons for supplying nature conservation differs with the 
variation of s, q and a, keeping individual preferences unchanged. 
 
As I already explained in chapter 2.1.1.4, the strictness of nature conservation s is left unchanged. 
The supply of an amount of nature conservation area [ha] is an exchange of payments [per ha] in 
terms of one property right (e.g. monetary units, apples, or the right to collect fuelwood in an 
adjacent forest, expressed per hectare) with another property right relevant for nature 
conservation (e.g. the access right, expressed in hectares). The height of payments a supplier 
receives per hectare determines the number of hectares on which he is willing to abandon his 
access right for the purpose of nature conservation.  
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The concept of decreasing marginal utility allows the modeling of an individual supply at 
different individually evaluated payments pS..  
 
 
2.2.2 Individually Valuated Received Payments pS 
 
Total utility decreases with abandonment of the alternative use. To remain at the same utility 
level, this reduced utility has to be compensated by payments the supplier will receive and 
further values equal to the lost utility that would have been spent by the alternative. 
 
The condition for voluntary supply of property rights for nature conservation is equal or higher 
valuation of the received payments compared to the lost utility that results from the abandoned 
alternative use. 
 
The received payments do not have to be made in monetary units. The term "payments pS" 
comprises not only the property right for monetary units that are employed for the exchange of 
a property right for nature conservation. It also includes a special property right for hunting or 
recreation in other land areas, which non-suppliers of nature conservation do not have. 
 
 
2.2.3 Hypotheses for the Individual Supply of Nature Conservation 
 
Individuals with the same preferences, bundles of property rights and productivity would have 
an identical supply curve. Although the conducted derivation of the supply curve is not 
commonly used in economic textbooks, I obtained supply curves that correspond to the ones in 
the relevant literature (Samuelson & Nordhaus 1995: 131; Mankiw 2001: 297; Besanko & 
Braeutigam 2005: 247; Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2005: 273).  
 
These curves indicate the quantity of land area on which the owner would allocated one 
property right to nature conservation at every possible height of payment per hectare pS. Each 
point on the supply curve indicates the equality between valuation of the received payments and 
valuation of the lost alternative (marginal costs MC, valuation of an additional allocation of the 
relevant property right to other uses): pS = MC. 
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The following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
An individual would provide more rights for nature conservation if he received higher payments 
in return, ceteris paribus. 
 
This implies that stricter nature conservation can only be voluntarily achieved with higher 
payments, ceteris paribus. The payments that are necessary to make to landowners for 
voluntarily ceasing timber production are expected to be higher than the payments that are 
necessary for a voluntary increase in tree species diversity in forest monocultures. 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
More nature conservation is supplied by individuals who own larger bundles of property rights, 
compared to individuals with smaller bundles, ceteris paribus. 
 
As a consequence, more nature conservation area is implemented on larger land properties than 
on smaller ones. More nature conservation is practiced by individuals who have larger 
recreation areas at their disposal in comparison to individuals with smaller ones. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  
Homogeneous payments induce that the relevant property right is allocated to nature 
conservation on a larger area by individuals who are confronted with a lower productivity of the 
considered property right, ceteris paribus. 
 
As an implication of this, more nature conservation is supplied on land with low site 
productivity, low net present value of forest stands, low game population density, and low 
recreational value of a lake. 
 
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 are simple supply curves from the economist’s point of view. Nevertheless, 
I decided to formulate these relationships as a hypothesis. This is reasoned in two facts: firstly, I 
suppose that the scientific background of some readers is not an economic one, but rather a 
scientific and forest-related perspective; secondly, when observing the political discussion 
regarding the amount of area to be protected, the impression evolves that nature conservation is 
supplied for free. The fact that individuals have to pay for a good which shall be supplied in a 
society is sometimes neglected in this discourse.  
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Figure 2.3: Different Supply of Nature Conservation by Three Individuals with Unequal Evaluation 
 
 
Based on these hypotheses, the following supply curves SL, SM and SH in figure 2.3 can be drawn. 
These three supply curves illustrate any of the three individuals with different preferences but 
equally-seized bundles of property rights and equal productivity: 
 
SL=Low interest in supplying nature conservation. 
SM=Medium interest in supplying nature conservation. 
SH=High interest in supplying nature conservation 
 
or three individuals with three different sized bundles of property rights but equal preference 
patterns and equal productivity: 
 
SL=Small bundle of property rights. 
SM=Medium bundle of property rights. 
SH=Large bundle of property rights. 
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3 Analysis 
 
3.1 Organization of Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation 
 
Solely with the individual demand and the individual supply curve, a voluntary or involuntary 
exchange of property rights and an implementation of nature conservation cannot be explained. 
Therefore the combination of both curves is necessary. Furthermore, individuals act within a 
society. Therefore nature conservation is not only demanded and supplied by one single 
individual within a society. As a consequence, the individual demand and supply curves need to 
be aggregated to obtain total demand and total supply. 
 
 
3.1.1 Aggregation of Individual Choices 
 
When studying the total demand (Dagg) and supply (Sagg) curves in figure 3.1, we remain unaware 
of two aspects: 
 We have no information on the individual demand and supply curves. 
 We have no information on the aggregation of the different individual demand and supply 
curves. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Aggregated Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation [ha] 
 
 
Demand and supply curves can be aggregated either by a vertical or horizontal addition. The 
first is applied if political exchange was chosen, the second is relevant if individuals exchange 
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property rights via markets. Whether demand and supply curves are horizontally or vertically 
aggregated is determined by the chosen decision-making process and not by the characteristics 
of the considered good (non-rivalry and non-excludability). The individuals of a society choose, 
whether they demand (supply) nature conservation individually or collectively. Individuals can 
buy and demand land area for nature conservation purposes alone or within a collective. 
Species-rich hedges can be planted by individual or collective landowners. Obviously this 
thought can be transferred to two everyday examples: (1) individuals decide whether they 
would bake and eat a cake alone or together with other individuals; (2) an indoor swimming 
pool with three lanes can be demanded by one single or by a collective. In the last case, the 
collective has to agree on the number of lanes they demand. The indoor swimming pool can be 
supplied and provided either by a single individual (e.g. a rich citizen) or by a collective (a 
municipality).  
 
 
3.1.1.1 Political Exchange 
 
The process of determining unanimously one quantity of nature conservation that is demanded 
by a collective is described by the Lindahl equilibrium. Different individuals with different 
demand curves (DA and DB in figure 3.2) agree on one jointly demanded quantity. This 
unanimous choice requires an evaluation-based taxation or cost-sharing, the Lindahl tax (1958: 
173). With evaluation-based taxation, the individuals who form a collective would demand one 
amount of land area (expressed in hectares) on which, for instance, harvesting is abandoned or 
hiking reduced.  
 
Usually the quantity of the Lindahl equilibrium is illustrated as the intersection point of the 
vertically aggregated demand curve (Dagg) with the constant marginal costs for supplying the 
considered good (Sobel 2004: 30). I will transfer this standard illustration of collective choice-
making for determining the collective demand onto the collective supply of the good "nature 
conservation". I examine the situation in which the marginal costs of the supply of nature 
conservation are an outcome of collective choice-making as well. Individuals choose whether 
they prefer to supply nature conservation individually or collectively. If they choose the last 
opportunity, one collective agrees on one amount of land that is allocated to nature 
conservation. The different individuals of the collective have different preferences and therefore 
different supply curves exist (SD and SE in figure 3.2). How can different individuals of one 
collective agree on one quantity of supplied nature conservation area? These individual supply 
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curves are aggregated vertically (Sagg) to illustrate the unanimously chosen quantity of nature 
conservation that will be supplied if an evaluation-based revenue-sharing system is applied. 
 
When making collective choices, the individuals with different preferences of one collective 
agree on one quantity or quality of nature conservation they will demand MD or supply MS. This is 
only the case if they are confronted with different heights of payments (DPA and DPB; SPD and 
SPE). When adding these payments, I receive the budget the collective is willing to provide TDPP 
(and willing to accept TSPP) for the implementation of the specific quantity of nature 
conservation.  
 
𝑇𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 𝐷𝑃𝐴 + 𝐷𝑃𝐵 
𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑃𝐷 + 𝑆𝑃𝐸 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Vertical Aggregation of Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation [ha] 
 
 
Every individual chooses the quantity of nature conservation he would voluntarily demand or 
supply at certain payments. Choosing within a political exchange implies that payments are not 
given as is the case with market exchange. The individuals of a collective have to agree not only 
on the amount of nature conservation but also on the expenditure and revenue sharing rule: do 
all members of a collective have to pay/receive the same height of payments (expenditures and 
revenues) or shall different criteria be applied (as for instance the height of income, property 
size, preferences and so forth) to elaborate different payments for the individuals (Vanberg 
1982: 16ff.). With the aim of reducing decision-making costs, both of the questions considering 
the sharing rule and the quantity of nature conservation are separated. In the following 
considerations I always assume that specific expenditure and revenue sharing rules already 
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exist and are not an object of choice-making. Obviously, different sharing rules influence the 
outcome of the collectively chosen quantity of nature conservation. 
 
 
3.1.1.2 Market Exchange 
 
Individuals are confronted with the same payments and every individual chooses the quantity 
[ha] of the relevant property right for nature conservation he voluntarily would demand 
(𝐷𝑄𝐴 and 𝐷𝑄𝐵) and supply (𝑆𝑄𝐷 and 𝑆𝑄𝐸) (see figure 3.3). These quantities are summed up. The 
total demand TQDM and the total supply TQSM at one payment p are: 
 
𝑇𝐷𝑄𝑀 = 𝐷𝑄𝐴 + 𝐷𝑄𝐵 
𝑇𝑆𝑄𝑀 = 𝑆𝑄𝐷 + 𝑆𝑄𝐸 
 
With this, the choosing individuals do not have to agree on one collective quantity of nature 
conservation, but rather every individual can choose his own most preferred quantity.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Horizontal Aggregation of Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation [ha] 
 
 
3.1.1.3 Organization of Demand for and Supply of Nature Conservation 
 
When I include the observations of section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 in my considerations on the 
implementation of nature conservation, the organization of demand and supply can be 
combined differently. When nature conservation is demanded and supplied, both can be done 
either individually or collectively. A collective demand does not imply a collective supply and 
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vice versa. Single individuals can demand property rights for nature conservation and nature 
conservation associations supply (cell 3 in table 3.1) them, and vice versa. The four combinations 
of the organization of demand and supply for nature conservation are drawn in table 3.1. 
 
The organization of demand and supply does not exist by itself but has also been selected in a 
previous choice by the society's members. The choice for demanding and supplying collectively 
(cell 4) instead of individually (cell 1) might have different reasons, for instance the reduction in 
prices (Buchanan 1965: 4; Tullock 1969: 190; Blankart 2006: 73ff.), the enjoyment of doing 
things together, or the transaction costs of an individual demand and supply that are perceived 
as too high. 
 
Table 3.1: Organization of Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation 
Combinations of Choices Concerning 
Demand and Supply of Nature 
Conservation 
Demand 
Individually ID Collectively CD 
Supply 
Individually IS Cell 1: ID and IS Cell 2: CD and IS 
Collectively CS Cell 3: ID and CS Cell 4: CD and CS 
 
 
3.2 Institutions of Exchanging Nature Conservation 
 
The exchange of property rights for nature conservation is either voluntary or involuntary. An 
involuntary exchange is only possible if the members of the considered society have voluntarily 
agreed on the possible use of coercion in a constitutional choice. 
 
 
3.2.1 Voluntary Exchange 
 
When individuals exchange nature conservation voluntarily, they value the received property 
right equally or higher compared to the right they have to give away. If the subjective value of 
the received property right were lower than the ceded one, no voluntary exchange would take 
place. Voluntary exchange takes place if the interacting individuals A and D agree on the height 
of payments p [per ha] at which they would buy (pDA) or sell (pSD) property rights and on the 
demanded (MDA) and supplied (MSD) quantity of the property right [ha] at this specific payment: 
𝑀𝐷𝐴 = 𝑀𝑆𝐷 and 𝑝𝐷𝐴 = 𝑝𝑆𝐷 .  
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The intersection point IAD of the individual demand curve of individual A and the supply curve of 
individual D is the only point or payment-quantity-relation at which voluntary exchange of 
nature conservation takes place between individual A and D. 
 
Consumer surplus and producer surplus can be either equal – if the absolute value of the slope of 
the demand and supply curve is equal – or of different height.  
 
 
3.2.2 Involuntary Exchange 
 
If individuals can simply withdraw the membership of an association, they would do so to avoid 
confrontation with less preferred share-quantity-relations. If the costs of leaving a collective, for 
instance immigrating from country, leaving a municipality, leaving family and so forth are too 
high, they finally have to accept these relationships. The acceptance of them is still better than 
leaving the collective.  
 
Demanding and supplying nature conservation by using the state implies a possible element of 
perceived coercion. State demand and supply encompass individuals who neither want to 
demand/supply the good nor demand/supply it collectively. Even those individuals who do not 
demand a good will (1) receive it and (2) have to pay for it. This implies coerced financing and 
coerced consumption. Individuals who do not want to provide nature conservation are coerced 
to supply it. The more precisely considered characteristic of the state is an increase in the 
entrance and exit barriers: the conditions for voting-with-the-feet (Tiebout 1956: 41816; Mueller 
2003: 187) are not given or emigrating and immigrating is much more expensive compared to 
the withdrawal of an association's membership. Since individuals deliberately refuse emigration 
they inherently accept (1) to finance collectively goods they do not want, (2) to provide them, 
and (3) to receive them. 
 
When considering involuntary exchange, the fundamental structure of exchange between 
individuals is dissolved. Involuntary exchange implies that payments or quantities are 
exogenously determined and can be enforced by coercion. Starting from an equilibrium of 
exchanging nature conservation, payments and quantities can be exogenously determined and 
are higher or lower compared to equilibrium payments and quantity. Only by coincidence are 
equilibrium payments or equilibrium quantity (at which individuals would voluntary exchange) 
                                                          
16 "The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern 
for public goods." (Tiebout 1956: 418) 
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met with the exogenously determined quantity and payments. The determination of property 
rights that shall be allocated to nature conservation follows two strategies:  
 Either an eminent domain with compensation or  
 Confiscation linked with the taking of property rights for the purpose of nature conservation 
can be applied.  
 
 
3.2.2.1 Eminent Domain 
 
The subsequent compensation of an eminent domain that is exogenously determined and at 
which individuals have to demand or have to supply nature conservation might be  
 Higher: pHIGH 
 Lower: pLOW 
compared to equilibrium payments pI.  
 
The same is applicable to exogenously given quantities that have to be demanded or supplied at 
a specific height of payments. They might also be 
 Higher: MHIGH 
 Lower: MLOW 
compared to the equilibrium quantity MI. 
 
Lastly, fixed payment-quantity-relationships can be determined as well. These exogenously 
determined relationships do not match the individual payment-quantity-relationships. At the 
given payments the individuals would never voluntarily supply or demand the given quantities. 
In this case, both variables are exogenously given. With this, demanders or suppliers cannot 
choose either quantities (as in the case of exogenous payments) or heights of payments (as in 
the case of exogenous quantities/qualities) and cannot adjust to the determined variable. 
 
 
3.2.2.2 Confiscation 
 
Nature conservation is not only implemented by exchanges, but also by takings and with this by 
confiscation of property rights. These rights are "taken away" without paying compensation to 
the individuals or collectives in return. Takings imply that demanding individuals/collectives 
choose the quantity of nature conservation as if the individual share is zero. Further, the 
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supplying individuals/collectives choose the provided quantity of nature conservation as if their 
received payments are zero as well.  
 
The basis that takings can occur is 
 That property rights are defined and owned by the members of a society. 
 That the society’s members agreed in a constitutional choice on the use of takings. 
 
If the strategy “confiscation” is chosen, both demanders and suppliers can be affected. 
Individuals who do not want and do not value the good "nature conservation" have to finance it, 
and individuals who provide nature conservation receive nothing in return. In both cases, 
individuals abandon a right they value and receive either nothing or a right that is not valuable 
to them. Two scenarios are possible:  
 Individuals are coerced into suppling property rights for nature conservation without 
receiving any payments. Since the payments equal zero, p = 0, the demanders of property 
rights for nature conservation demand the satiation level of nature conservation.  
 Property rights for nature conservation are voluntarily supplied at payments p that exceed 
prohibitive payments pp, p > pp, of the demanders for the good "nature conservation".  
 
 
3.3 Institutional and Organizational Arrangements for Implementing Nature 
Conservation 
 
The combination of the presented organization of demand and supply of nature conservation 
with the introduced institutions results in a matrix of four rows and three columns (see table 
3.2) that illustrate the various institutional and organizational arrangements in the field of 
nature conservation. All of them will be considered in the following analysis. 
 
Table 3.2: Possible Institutional and Organizational Arrangements for Implementing Nature Conservation 
Institutional and 
Organizational Arrangements 
Voluntary Exchange 
Chapter 3.4 
Eminent Domain 
Chapter 3.5 
Confiscation 
Chapter 3.6 
ID and IS section 3.4.1 section 3.5.1 section 3.6.1 
CD and CS section 3.4.2 section 3.5.2 section 3.6.2 
CD and IS section 3.4.3 section 3.5.3 section 3.6.3 
ID and CS section 3.4.4 section 3.5.3 section 3.6.3 
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3.4 Voluntary Exchange of Property Rights for Nature Conservation 
 
3.4.1 Individual Demand and Individual Supply 
 
Considering the cases in which demand for and supply of nature conservation is determined by 
individual choices, two different relationships between demanders and suppliers are possible, 
which are both illustrated in figure 3.4:  
 
 The demanding and supplying individuals can be the same person (𝐼𝐷 ≡ 𝐼𝑆). In this case, the 
implementation of nature conservation is equivalent to a subsistence economy. 
 Demanders and suppliers can be different individuals (𝐼𝐷 ≠ 𝐼𝑆). They mutually exchange the 
property rights for nature conservation. 
 
In the following figure 3.4, demand and supply curves of three individuals in each case and with 
equal preferences are drawn (𝐷𝐴 = 𝐷𝐵 = 𝐷𝐶 and 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝐹). These individual demand and 
supply curves are aggregated horizontally to the aggregated demand and supply curves of three 
individuals (𝐷𝑎𝑔𝑔 and 𝑆𝑎𝑔𝑔). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Voluntary Exchange when Nature Conservation is Demanded and Supplied Individually 
 
 
3.4.1.1 Subsistence Economy 
 
In a subsistence economy, a single individual A is demander (DA in figure 3.4) and supplier (SD in 
figure 3.4) at the same time. At specific payments pDA = pSD, individual A demands a quantity of 
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nature conservation (MDA) he is as well willing to supply at this payments (MSD). It is MDA = MSD. 
This situation is illustrated with the intersection point IAD in figure 3.4. 
 
MDA = MSD is the quantity of nature conservation [ha] the individual would provide with his own 
bundle of property rights. It is: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝐴 = 𝑀𝑆𝐷 and 𝑝𝐷𝐴 = 𝑝𝑆𝐷 . 
 
This condition is self-explanatory since the individual cannot demand more quantity at 
payments at which he is not willing to supply this amount or produce more nature conservation 
at payments at which he is not willing to demand. Since the direction of exchange is inverse, the 
slope of demand curve DA and supply curve SD have the same absolute value. With this, the 
consumer surplus CS equals the producer surplus PS. 
 
|
𝑑𝑝𝐷𝐴
𝑑𝑀𝐷𝐴
| = |
𝑑𝑝𝑆𝐷
𝑑𝑀𝑆𝐷
| 
 
 
3.4.1.2 Mutual Exchange 
 
If 𝐷𝐴 ≠ 𝑆𝐷 , individuals A and D in figure 3.4 determine the quantity and quality of the good 
"nature conservation" they want to demand or supply at specific heights of payments, pDA = pSD. 
At specific payments, quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. With this, voluntary 
exchange can take place. Both individuals, demanders and suppliers, benefit from the mutual 
exchange. If no equilibrium evolves, the exchange fails (if 𝑀𝐷𝐴 ≠ 𝑀𝑆𝐷 and  𝑝𝐷𝐴 = 𝑝𝑆𝐷 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝐷𝐴 =
𝑀𝑆𝐷 and 𝑝𝐷𝐴 ≠ 𝑝𝑆𝐷). 
 
 
3.4.2 Collective Demand and Collective Supply 
 
Considering this organizational combination for the implementation of nature conservation, 
individual choices are aggregated vertically to one collective outcome on both sides – for 
determining the collective demand and the collective supply, as shown in figure 3.5. 
 
When examining the implementation of nature conservation, four different relationships 
between the demanding and the supplying collective can be methodically elaborated:  
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(1) The supplying collective provides nature conservation only for another collective: 𝐶𝐷 ≠ 𝐶𝑠. 
(2) The supplying collective provides nature conservation only for the whole own collective: 
𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑠. 
(3) The supplying collective is a subset of the demanding collective: 𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑠. 
(4) The demanding collective is a part of the supplying collective: 𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑠. 
 
 
3.4.2.1 The Demanding and Supplying Collective Are Not Identical: CD ≠ CS  
 
Two collectives agree voluntarily on the exchange of property rights for nature conservation. 
With this demanders CD and suppliers CS are members of two different collectives, 𝐶𝐷 ≠ 𝐶𝑆. An 
example is two associations, for instance a nature conservation organization and an allotment 
club, that agree on the installation of nesting boxes.  
 
The introduction of collectives implies that payments as expenditures and revenues are made or 
received by the collectives and further shared among members of the collective. With the 
separation of the demanding and the supplying collective, one collective has to choose either an 
expenditure sharing system or a revenue sharing system, but not both. 
 
 
3.4.2.1.1 Equal Preferences 
 
At first I consider two collectives of three individuals each (demanding collective: individuals A, 
B and C, supplying collective: individuals D, E and F) (see figure 3.5). All three individuals of 
every collective have the same preferences, resulting in an identical demand curve 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐷𝐵 =
𝐷𝐶 and supply curve 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝐹. When forming the collective demand curve for two 
individuals (Dagg2) or three individuals (Dagg3) and the collective supply curves (Sagg2 and Sagg3) 
with the vertical summation (Mueller 2003: 82), the individual curves and the collective curves 
intersect at the same quantity of nature conservation. 
 
 
Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
The height of expenditures/revenues on which the collective demand intersects the collective 
supply corresponds to the expenditure share Qa = Qb = Qc and revenue share Pd = Pe = Pf, at which 
the individual curves intersect, multiplied by the number of individuals (with equal 
preferences). If a Lindahl-taxing and collective revenue sharing according to the individuals' 
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evaluation is applied, the collective demand and supply coincide. No over-demand and over-
supply will be observable. The individuals of the collectives are demanding and supplying the 
same amount 𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆 at the same height of total expenditures 𝑇𝐸  and total revenues 𝑇𝑅: 
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 
𝑀𝐷 Demanded quantity 
𝑀𝑆 Supplied quantity 
𝑇𝐸  Total expenditures 
𝑇𝑅  Total revenues 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Voluntary Exchange when Nature Conservation is Demanded and Supplied Collectively, Based on 
Equal Preferences and Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
 
In this situation, equal expenditure shares and revenue shares result in a unanimously chosen 
quantity of nature conservation [ha]. The individuals of the collective agree on the area to which 
they allocate one property right to nature conservation. The individually chosen quantity equals 
the collectively chosen one. All individual preferences of the demanding and supplying collective 
are reflected by the collective outcome that determines the demanded or supplied quantity. 
Further, the exchange between the demanding and supplying collective is successful.  
 
 
Non-Evaluation Based Sharing Systems 
Even if individuals have the same evaluation scheme for nature conservation, their individual 
expenditure and revenue share might be different because other criteria have been used (for 
instance land property, monthly income height) for determining the individual shares. The 
consequence is:  
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𝑄𝑎 ≠ 𝑄𝑏 ≠ 𝑄𝑐  and 𝑃𝑑 ≠ 𝑃𝑒 ≠ 𝑃𝑓 although 
𝐴 = 𝐵 = 𝐶 and 𝐷 = 𝐸 = 𝐹, but 𝑄𝑎 = 𝑃𝑑;  𝑄𝑏 = 𝑃𝑒 and 𝑄𝑐 = 𝑃𝑓 . 
 
Therefore, the individuals of the demanding and supplying collectives will choose different 
quantities of property rights for nature conservation (see figure 3.6). Within the demanding 
collective, A chooses Y, B chooses X, and C chooses Z. For the supplying collective, D chooses Y, E 
chooses X, and F chooses Z. This implies a unanimous agreement on either the lowest amount Y –
 when an increase in nature conservation is in question – or on the highest amount Z – if a 
decrease in nature conservation is the item. Collective outcome does not represent individual 
preferences but only the smallest (or highest) quantity all the individuals have agreed on. Yet, a 
disagreement and with that failure of the collective demand and supply is worse than accepting 
a quantity that does not exactly meet individual preferences. 
 
In the previous case I assumed that the individuals of the demanding and the supplying 
collective have the same evaluation scheme for the allocation of property rights to nature 
conservation. Further on I applied non-evaluation-based expenditure and revenue sharing 
systems with an equal structure (for instance 𝑄𝑎 = 𝑃𝑑). This results in: 
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆  and 𝑇𝐸 ≠ 𝑇𝑅 
 
If I introduced different non-evaluation-based sharing systems (that results in 𝑄𝑎 ≠ 𝑃𝑑), not 
only would the height of total expenditures TE and total revenues TR deviate, but the collectively 
chosen demanded and supplied quantities would as well. It is:  
 
𝑀𝐷 ≠ 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 ≠ 𝑇𝑅 
 
The sharing systems influence the accomplishment or failure of exchanges between collectives. 
With an iterative adjustment of the expenditure and revenue sharing systems, exchanges 
between collectives are enabled and  
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 is obtained. 
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Figure 3.6: Voluntary Exchange when Nature Conservation is Demanded and Supplied Collectively, Based on 
Equal Preferences and Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
 
3.4.2.1.2 Different Individual Preferences 
 
In the previous analysis I considered individuals with equal preferences and equal evaluation 
schemes. But individuals are different. Therefore, in the next step I will drop the condition of 
equality and assume two collectives with two individuals each (reasoned in a clearer 
illustration): individuals A and B with different demand curves (DA, DB) and individuals D and E 
with different supply curves (SD, SE) (see figures 3.7 and 3.8). 
 
 
Non-Evaluation Based Sharing Systems 
The quantities that will be demanded and supplied by the individuals of the collectives depend 
on the applied fiscal institution. If the expenditures and revenues are equally generated and 
shared among the individuals (Q in figure 3.7), the individuals’ demand and supply differ inter-
individually. 
 
On the demand-side, individual A chooses V and B chooses W. D on the supply-side prefers Y and 
E chooses X. 
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Figure 3.7: Voluntary Exchange when Nature Conservation is Demanded and Supplied Collectively, Based on 
Unequal Preferences and Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
 
The simple fact that individuals differ results in different chosen quantities of nature 
conservation when an equal height of exogenous expenditure shares Q and revenue shares P are 
given and Q = P. Although 3 ∗ 𝑄 = 𝑇𝐸  and 3 ∗ 𝑃 = 𝑇𝑅 and with this 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅, the demanded and 
supplied quantities deviate: 
 
𝑀𝐷 ≠ 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 
 
Collectively chosen quantities to be supplied or demanded will deviate. Again, reasoned in the 
applied expenditure and revenue sharing systems, exchanges might fail that would be successful 
if an evaluation-based sharing system were introduced.  
 
Unanimous choices are only made for the following quantities of land area on which one 
property right is allocated to nature conservation:  
 
(1) The collective agrees unanimously on quantity V (W) when determining the increase 
(reduction) in nature conservation area. For the quantities between V and W no agreement 
will be reached. 
(2) The collective agrees unanimously on quantity X (Y) when determining a higher (lower) 
supply of nature conservation area. The individuals would agree unanimously either on the 
quantity of X or Y, but not on one between.  
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Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
Individual agreement on the quantity supplied at Iagg is only possible when one specific 
expenditure and revenue sharing is applied (see figure 3.8). For reaching this, the expenditure 
sharing system 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑄𝑎 + 𝑄𝑏 will deviate from the revenue sharing system 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑃𝑑 + 𝑃𝑒 , 
keeping total expenditures equal to total revenues. As a consequence, the exchange between 
demanding and supplying collectives succeeds since: 
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Voluntary Exchange when Nature Conservation is Demanded and Supplied Collectively, Based on 
Unequal Preferences and Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Economic Clubs 
 
In this special case, the demanding collective is identical to the supplying one: 𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑆. Clubs 
represent collective subsistence. Nature conservation organizations that own land, for instance a 
garden or a meadow orchard, are an example of this constellation17. With this, all the members 
                                                          
17 The term “club” shall be understood in an economic way, as J.M. Buchanan does. The financing of goods 
is solely realized by the members, not by donations of non-members: “The addition of members to a 
sharing group may, and normally will affect the cost of the good to any one member. The larger is the 
membership of the golf club the lower the dues to any single member, given a specific quantity of club 
facilities available per unit time.“ See “An Economic Theory of Clubs” published in 1965: 4. 
When observing relevant nature conservation organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
Greenpeace, NABU, Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND) or more locally acting ones such as Grüne Liga 
Sachsen e.V., they might be largely financed by donations that might be given by (1) non-members or (2) 
members. If the first is the case, they constitute no club in Buchanan's understanding. If the second is the 
case, Buchanan's understanding can be applied, allowing that some members contribute only the 
membership fee and other members the membership fee and an additional donation. 
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of one collective finance conservation measures and implement them (e.g. the maintenance of 
fruit trees and bee pasture). Demanding and supplying collectives are also identical when 
considering the state and nature conservation that is only implemented on state owned land. 
This is also applicable to the federal state, to the Laender and municipalities. 
 
A further example is a mountain village in the Alps. All the inhabitants are farmers and own 
forest ground that is located around the village. The preservation of natural mountain forests 
provides avalanche protection for the village. In this situation, the demanding collective is 
identical with the supplying one.  
 
Obviously, demand and supply of nature conservation via economic clubs is a special case since 
it suggests that no substitutes outside the considered club exist. An additional illustration is a 
forest enterprise community – a collective of forest land owners. The community’s coherent 
forest area forms the habitat for the black grouse. If all of the landowners have an interest in 
maintaining this species in the considered area and no other individuals are involved, the forest 
enterprise community forms a club. 
 
Figure 3.9 results when combining demand and supply curves of individuals A and B with 
different preferences. A and B are both, demanders (DA and DB) and suppliers (SA and SB). At 
point (Iagg), collective demand Dagg intersects collective supply Sagg.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: Collective Subsistence of Nature Conservation 
 
 
The previous illustration shows that if one collective is demanding and supplying nature 
conservation at the same time, two systems have to be elaborated within the collective:  
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(1) An expenditure sharing system and 
(2) A revenue sharing system.  
 
So, every single individual is confronted with expenditure shares and revenue shares. Of course, 
these sharing systems differ between different collectives that consist of different individuals 
with different preferences. Unanimously made choices for the quantity MD = MS can only be 
obtained when specific expenditure and revenue sharing systems are applied. Reasoned in the 
applied sharing systems, it might also be: 
 
𝑀𝐷 ≠ 𝑀𝑆and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝐷 ≠ 𝑀𝑆and 𝑇𝐸 ≠ 𝑇𝑅 . 
 
Further, the expenditure and revenue sharing systems applied in figure 3.9 imply a balanced 
budget: 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅. If other sharing systems are applied, budget deficits (𝑇𝐸 < 𝑇𝑅) or budget 
surplus (𝑇𝐸 > 𝑇𝑅) might result, although the quantity of property rights allocated to nature 
conservation is unanimously chosen: 
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆and 𝑇𝐸 ≠ 𝑇𝑅 . 
 
Again, if a club wants to implement nature conservation, an iterative finding of expenditure and 
revenue sharing system will occur, so that finally  
 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑀𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 
 
will be obtained. 
 
 
3.4.2.3 The Supplying Collective is a Subset of the Demanding Collective: CD ⊃ CS  
 
Not all individuals of a collective that demand property rights for nature conservation need to be 
as well suppliers. With this, a part of a collective CS offers rights for nature conservation that are 
demanded and financed by the whole collective CD. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.10. In 
practice this constellation could be found when the European Union as a collective finances 
nature conservation measures that are implemented in single Member States or by nature 
conservation organizations. This structure is transferrable to measures that are financed by the 
federal state (Laender), but implemented by the Laender (local municipalities). 
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I again consider a very simple situation in figure 3.10: three individuals A, B and C with equal 
preferences demand property rights for nature conservation, 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐷𝐵 = 𝐷𝐶. Either all of them 
are suppliers (𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝐹) – this is the case of section 3.4.2.2 – or only two or one of the 
collective’s members provide nature conservation.  
 
A demanding collective with a constant number of members but a decreasing number of 
suppliers (Sagg3→Sagg2→SD) implies an increase in supplied property rights for nature 
conservation (𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔3(𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑆) → 𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔2(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆) → 𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔1(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆)) at lower expenditure shares 
for the demanding individuals, but higher revenue shares for the supplying individuals (since 
the suppliers do not have to share the revenue between three but between two individuals). The 
individual consumer and producer surplus is larger compared to the situation in 3.4.2.1 and 
3.4.2.2, assuming that evaluation-based expenditure and revenue sharing is applied.  
 
 
Figure 3.10: Voluntary Exchange when a Collective Demand and Supply is Chosen but CS is a Subset of CD 
 
 
3.4.2.4 The Demanding Collective is a Subset of the Supplying Collective: CD ⊂ CS 
 
Of course, the reverse situation of the one considered in section 3.4.2.3 can be examined (see 
figure 3.11). Two individuals (A and B) demand property rights for nature conservation 
(𝐷𝐴 = 𝐷𝐵) but three individuals with equal preferences (𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝐹) supply them. 
 
If an evaluation-based expenditure sharing is applied, less rights for nature conservation will be 
implemented (𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔3(𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑆) → 𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔2(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆) → 𝐼𝑎𝑔𝑔1(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆)). The individual expenditure 
share for demanding individuals increases and the revenue share for supplying individuals 
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decreases, compared to the situations in 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2 and 3.4.4.3. Consumer surplus and the 
producer surplus will be reduced compared to the situations in 3.4.2.1, 3.4.2.2 and 3.4.2.3. 
 
Reasoned in the reduced consumer surplus (𝑎𝑑(𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆) < 𝑎𝑑(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆)) and producer surplus 
(𝑎𝑠(𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆) < 𝑎𝑠(𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆)), the increasing expenditure shares and the decreasing revenue 
shares, individuals endeavor to increase the number of demanders so that the number of 
demanders equals or exceeds the number of suppliers. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Voluntary Exchange when a Collective Demand and Supply is Chosen but CD is a Subset of CS 
 
 
3.4.2.5 Comparison of the Combination of Collectives 
 
When considering voluntary exchanges between collectives and an application of evaluation-
based expenditure and revenue sharing, the following order regarding to the area [ha] on which 
a property right is allocated to nature conservation, ceteris paribus, can be elaborated:  
 
𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆 > 𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑆 > 𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆 and 𝐶𝐷 ≠ 𝐶𝑆 ⋚ 𝐶𝐷 ≡ 𝐶𝑆. 
 
Examining the expenditure shares Q and revenue shares P which the individuals are confronted 
with when evaluation-based sharing systems are applied, it is: 
 
𝑄(𝐶𝐷⊂𝐶𝑆) > 𝑄(𝐶𝐷≡𝐶𝑆) > 𝑄(𝐶𝐷⊃𝐶𝑆) and 𝑃(𝐶𝐷⊃𝐶𝑆) > 𝑃(𝐶𝐷≡𝐶𝑆) > 𝑃(𝐶𝐷⊂𝐶𝑆). 
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3.4.3 Collective Demand and Individual Supply 
 
Since I want to avoid repetition, I do not consider the case of individuals with equal preferences, 
but rather I start with the assumption that individuals have different preferences, as figures 3.12 
and 3.13 show. These figures illustrate different demand curves of individuals A, B and C and the 
supply curve of individual D. The difference between these illustrations is the applied payments 
sharing system. In figure 3.13, all individuals of the demanding collective have to pay the same 
share and in figure 3.12 the height of individual expenditure shares is determined by individual 
preference.  
 
 
3.4.3.1 Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing 
 
If members of a collective are taxed in accordance with their individual preferences, as was 
described by Eric Lindahl (Lindahl 1958: 173), then quantities or qualities of nature 
conservation can be unanimously chosen. This is illustrated in figure 3.12. A has to pay Qa, B pays 
Qb, and C pays Qc. These different expenditure shares result in the unanimous choice of one and 
the same quantity by the members of the demanding collective.  
 
As a consequence, members of the collective are satisfied with the collective outcome and the 
resulting implementation of nature conservation. The implemented quantity lies on the 
vertically aggregated demand curve, presupposed that suppliers are available who are willing to 
supply the demanded quantity at the determined height of payments. 
 
A decreasing number of individual suppliers will lead to a reduction in the total amount of 
nature conservation area, but the expenditure share the demanding individuals provide and the 
individual producer surplus increases. If the number of suppliers increase, both the amount the 
single supplier implements and his producer surplus decreases. 
 
Let me assume that some individuals of the demanding collective are also the suppliers, for 
instance individuals A and B. In this situation, these individuals receive not only the consumer 
surplus, but the producer surplus as well. 
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Figure 3.12: Vertically Aggregated Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation [ha] with 
Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing 
 
 
3.4.3.2 Non-Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing 
 
If equal taxation with 𝑄𝑎 = 𝑄𝑏 = 𝑄𝑐  and 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑄𝑎 + 𝑄𝑏 + 𝑄𝑐  is applied, the three individuals A, B 
and C would demand different quantities of nature conservation: A chooses X, B chooses Y, and C 
chooses Z. The three individuals agree only on X or Z. X is chosen unanimously when the quantity 
of nature conservation will be increased, Z is chosen when a reduction in conservation area is 
discussed. Y will never be chosen. 
 
Either A and B (if Z was chosen) or B and C (if X was chosen) have to accept that their most 
preferred quantities of nature conservation are not represented by collective outcome. Since the 
exchange and the membership in a collective are both voluntary, the individuals obviously 
accept the deviation from their individual preferences. If collective outcome does not meet 
individual preferences and the individuals are still members of the collective, the collective 
demand for nature conservation of this specific collective is still better than demanding nature 
conservation alone or changing collective. Otherwise, the individuals would leave the collective.  
 
As another consequence of a non-evaluation based expenditure sharing, a quantity of nature 
conservation is implemented that is not identical with the deduced equilibrium quantity of the 
intersection point I in figure 3.13, when vertically aggregating the individual demand to a 
collective demand. There are two reasons for this:  
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 When the tax-share is 𝑄𝑎 = 𝑄𝑏 = 𝑄𝑐  and quantity X is unanimously chosen, the aggregated 
payments amount to 3*Qa(X). In this case, 3*Qa(X) is below the vertically aggregated demand 
curve. If the individuals would have agreed on Z, 3*Qc(Z) might be located above. With this, 
collective outcome for increasing implementation of nature conservation is lower (3*Qa(X)) 
than one demanded when tax-shares are evaluation-based. When discussing a reduction in 
implemented nature conservation, the chosen decrease will be lower compared to an 
evaluation-based sharing system and, with this, the collective agreed implemented nature 
conservation will be higher (3*Qc(Z)). 
 
 Furthermore, the suppliers change who voluntarily implement nature conservation. The 
supplier, who would supply nature conservation at the intersection point I, is not willing to 
supply this good when quantity-payments-relationships change (3*Qa(X) or 3*Qc(Z)) in the 
above described way and do not meet his supply curve. 
 
The reason for the failure of mutual exchanges lies in the expenditure sharing system of the 
considered collective, which demands (more) area on that one property right is allocated to 
nature conservation. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Vertically Aggregated Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation [ha] with Non-
Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing 
 
 
3.4.4 Individual Demand and Collective Supply 
 
This is the reversed combination of the organization of demand and supply, as illustrated in 
section 3.4.3. With this, the results found for the demanding collective in section 3.4.3 are 
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applicable to the present considered supplying collective. In figure 3.14, a collective that consists 
of individuals D, E and F supplies nature conservation (𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝐹). The demanders are single 
individuals (𝐴 = 𝐵 = 𝐶; 𝐷𝐴 = 𝐷𝐵 = 𝐷𝐶). Demand is aggregated horizontally to Dagg3 and supply 
vertically to Sagg3. 
 
 
3.4.4.1 Evaluation-Based Revenue Sharing 
 
To reach a unanimous choice of the quantity that individuals D, E and F will supply, again a 
revenue sharing system of the total revenues TR that is related to individual preferences is 
necessary. In figure 3.14, D receives Pd, E receives Pe and F receives Pf. As a consequence, all three 
individuals would choose the same quantity MS.  
 
 
Figure 3.14: Individual Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with an Evaluation-Based 
Sharing System 
 
 
If another sharing system had been chosen and applied in advance, these three individuals 
would prefer different quantities and collective outcome does not reflect the preferences of the 
single individuals, which are aggregated vertically to Sagg3 (see figure 3.15). 
 
If only A would demand nature conservation, both the equilibrium quantity and equilibrium 
payments are lower compared to the equilibrium quantity and payments when A, B and C 
demand together. But the individual A, being the only demander, demands more property rights 
for nature conservation compared to his demanded quantity when A, B and C demand together. 
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3.4.4.2 Non-Evaluation-Based Revenue Sharing 
 
If no evaluation-based payment sharing system is introduced, as shown in figure 3.15, all the 
supplying individuals receive 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑃𝑒 = 𝑃𝑓 and 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑃𝑑 + 𝑃𝑒 + 𝑃𝑓 . The three individuals of the 
supplying collective prefer different quantities: D chooses Y, E prefers X and F chooses Z. As a 
consequence, the quantity that will be unanimously chosen for TR will deviate from the vertically 
aggregated supply curve and further deviate from the chosen quantity MS in figure 3.14.  
 
Although individual E prefers quantity X, the collective outcome deviates: either Z is 
unanimously chosen, when an increase in supply of property rights for nature conservation is 
discussed, or quantity Y is chosen, when a decreasing supply is discussed. When Z is chosen and 
is valid for all three supplying individuals, the aggregated amount 3*Pf(Z) is located below Sagg3; 
if Y is chosen, then 3*Pd(Y) is located above the vertically aggregated supply curve.  
 
 
Figure 3.15: Individual Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with a Non-Evaluation-Based 
Sharing System 
 
 
If a decrease in supplied nature conservation is discussed and a non-evaluation-based sharing 
system is applied, the chosen quantity exceeds the quantity that would be chosen voluntarily 
when the individual supply curves are aggregated vertically. If an increase in supply is the 
matter of choice, the collectively chosen quantity will be lower compared to an evaluation-based 
sharing system. 
 
With this, the previous demanders that agreed on the mutual exchange will not voluntarily 
exchange property rights for nature conservation since the collectively determined payments-
H
ei
g
h
t 
o
f 
P
a
ym
en
ts
 i
n
 T
er
m
s 
o
f 
O
n
e 
P
ro
p
er
ty
 R
ig
h
t 
[p
er
 h
a
] 
Property Right Allocated to Nature Conservation [ha] 
DA = DB = DC Dagg3 
Sagg3 SF SE 
SD 
TR = 3*Pd(Y) = 3*Pe(X) = 3*Pf(Z) 
Pd = Pe = Pf 
X Y Z 
3*Pf(Z) 3*Pd(Y) 
Demand and Supply of Nature Conservation 
56 
 
quantity-relationship (either 3*Pf(Z) or 3*Pd(Y)) is not located on the horizontally aggregated 
demand curve Dagg3, and even not on the single demand curves DA = DB = DC. 
 
As a consequence, exchanges between individual demanders and collective suppliers will fail. 
Again, the failure can be found in the applied revenue sharing system. 
 
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
 
Analysis of voluntary exchange of one property right for nature conservation offers an initial 
impression of the complexity of criteria that allow a successful, mutual beneficiary exchange: 
individuals need to be voluntary members of a collective, for instance nature conservation 
associations or hiking associations, and in addition to that, single individuals or individuals as 
members of the collective agree voluntarily and unanimously on the exchange of the considered 
property rights for nature conservation. 
 
If collectives make choices on demand and supply, they apply – consciously or unconsciously – 
an expenditure sharing system for the first issue and a revenue sharing system for the second 
one. Otherwise the collective's members would assume they will receive or provide nature 
conservation for free. This contradicts the basic structure of exchanges. Only one expenditure 
and one revenue sharing system exists so that all members agree unanimously on one quantity 
of nature conservation and the exchange is Pareto optimal. 
 
If an evaluation-based expenditure and revenue sharing system was chosen in advance, the 
individuals are confident with the unanimously chosen collective outcome. If deviating sharing 
systems are applied, two consequences evolve: 
 
 Although unanimously choosing a quantity of nature conservation, individual preferences 
regarding the quantity of nature conservation are not reflected by collective outcome and 
the individuals would prefer another sharing system. They only agree on this quantity since 
they perceive this quantity at the individual share as better than every other quantity, as 
better than a failure of exchange (and with this no demand and/or supply of nature 
conservation), and also as better than leaving the collective and demanding and/or 
supplying nature conservation alone. For persisting voluntary collectives and for preventing 
individuals from resigning their membership, adjustment of individual shares that finally 
meet individual preferences can be expected. 
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 Collective outcome on demand and supply deviates from the collective intersection point 
that would be met if an evaluation-based sharing system is applied. Both interacting 
collectives cannot agree on one payments-quantity-relationship. As a consequence of these 
different relationships, no agreement can be reached and the voluntary implementation of 
nature conservation fails.  
 
If suppliers (demanders) choose individually, every human being can implement (demand) his 
preferred quantity of nature conservation. This is not the case when a collective choice with 
equal expenditure and/or revenue shares and a rule of unanimity is applied. In this case, the 
lowest amount members of the collective can agree on is chosen and further valid for all the 
collective's members. If three different individuals are considered, three times the lowest 
amount will be demanded or supplied. If single individuals choose, different heights of nature 
conservation are implemented that will exceed this collectively supplied (demanded) amount. 
 
If collectives interact and evaluation-based sharing systems are applied, the individuals would 
prefer that the supplying collective is part of the demanding one. With this, the expenditure 
share for demanders decreases and the revenue share for suppliers increases. The individual 
consumer and producer surplus augments. More nature conservation will be implemented 
compared to situations in which the demanding collective is a subset of or identical to the 
supplying one. 
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3.5 Eminent Domain of Property Rights for the Purpose of Nature Conservation 
 
Property rights are not only allocated to nature conservation based on voluntary mutual 
agreements between individuals or collectives. Not always will a mutual bargaining process take 
place that results in a payments-quantity-equilibrium, but rather an external determination of 
either quantities, payments or both is common in practical nature conservation. 
 
Exogenous payments might be higher or lower compared to the equilibrium payment. The same 
is possible for exogenously determined quantities. Further, fixed payments-quantity-
relationships are preset. All three cases will be considered in the following for every institutional 
and organizational arrangement (see table 3.2) for implementing nature conservation.  
 
 
3.5.1 Individual Demand and Individual Supply 
 
3.5.1.1 Exogenously Determined Payments 
 
If payments are exogenously given and larger than zero, the demanders (DA) have to pay this 
specific height of payments and the suppliers (SD) receive this specific amount for their provided 
quantities of nature conservation. But these payments deviate from the equilibrium one pI, at 
which quantity MI of nature conservation is exchanged, as figure 3.16 shows. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Individual Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Payments 
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At pLOW, individual D would supply quantity X and individual A demand quantity Y. Since X < Y, 
lower payments would lead to an over-demand of property rights for nature conservation. At 
pHIGH, individual D would supply quantity X' and individual A demand quantity Y’. Since X’ > Y', 
higher payments would lead to an over-supply of property rights for nature conservation. pHIGH 
and pLOW always reduces the individual producer surplus. Only pHIGH decreases unambiguously 
the consumer surplus. pLOW can imply both a reduction and an increase. 
 
 
3.5.1.2 Exogenously Determined Quantities 
 
Individual D would voluntarily supply the exogenously determined quantity MLOW at payments at 
the height of pX (see figure 3.17). A demands MLOW at payments pY. Since pX < pY, lower exogenous 
quantity of nature conservation area compared to MI lead to a surplus of payments made by the 
demanders – payments that are not necessary for paying suppliers of the good “nature 
conservation”. The exogenously determined quantity MHIGH would be supplied by individual D at 
pX' and demanded by individual A at pY'. Since pX' > pY', higher exogenous quantities of nature 
conservation area MHIGH lead to a deficit of payments, which cannot sufficiently compensate the 
payments at which suppliers would provide voluntarily MHIGH. The evolving budget surplus (in 
the case of MLOW) and budget deficit (in the case of MHIGH) result in an implementation of the 
determined quantity, but at different qualities, again compared to the MI. The quality at MLOW 
(MHIGH) is higher (lower) compared to the quality at MI. 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Individual Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Quantities 
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3.5.1.3 Exogenously Determined Payments-Quantity-Relationship 
 
Exogenously given payments-quantity-relationships as PQLOW and PQHIGH in figure 3.18 lead to no 
over-demand or over-supply and to no budget surplus or deficit, but harm and advantage 
demanders and/or suppliers since the determined payments-quantity-relationships PQLOW and 
PQHIGH do not represent the most preferred combination at IAD. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: Individual Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Payments-Quantity-Relationship 
 
 
3.5.2 Collective Demand and Collective Supply 
 
When considering the influence of exogenously determined payments on collectives, two 
implications evolve: 
 The collective is confronted with exogenously determined payments. 
 The members of a collective are confronted with determined shares reasoned in the applied 
expenditure or revenue sharing system. 
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3.5.2.1 Exogenously Determined Payments 
 
3.5.2.1.1 Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
Exogenously determined total expenditures or total revenues might be higher or lower 
compared to the total expenditures or revenues at the collective equilibrium Iagg. I consider two 
collectives that consists each of two individuals (A and B (with DA and DB) and D and E (with SD 
and SE)) with different preferences, as done in figure 3.19, and are confronted with higher 
payments pHIGH, compared to pI. 
 
Further, each individual has to pay or receive a share according to his individual preferences: Qa, 
Qb, Pd and Pe. All individuals are confronted with the same consequences: higher shares resulting 
from higher payments pHIGH imply a collective over-supply. If lower payments are exogenously 
determined, lower individual shares would result in a collective over-demand.  
 
In the first case, too much nature conservation would be implemented (MS > MD), in the second 
case too less (MS < MD), compared to the equilibrium quantity MI at Iagg. The individuals with 
equal preferences are of unanimous opinion considering the quantity and quality of nature 
conservation area. Every individual contributes to over-demand or over-supply. The individuals 
are confident with their choices, although they imply over–demand or over-supply. The single 
individuals have no incentive to change their choices and to choose a higher or lower quantity at 
a given share. 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Payments and an Evaluation-Based Sharing System 
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3.5.2.1.2 Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing Systems 
 
Reasoned in the application of non-evaluation-based expenditure and revenue shares, individual 
choices regarding the quantity of property rights for nature conservation will deviate. An 
unambiguous proposition, whether the collective will be confronted with an over-demand or an 
over-supply, cannot be made. 
 
This situation is illustrated in figures 3.20 and 3.21. Two different sharing systems are applied in 
these illustrations. Two demanding individuals A and B pay Qa and Qb with TE = Qa + Qb and the 
supplying individuals D and E receive Pd and Pe with TR = Pd + Pe. 
 
Since in figure 3.20 the share of B and D decreases and the share of A and E increases, compared 
to an evaluation-based sharing system, the preferred quantities deviate. If a unanimity rule is 
applied and an increase in nature conservation is the item of choice, the collective agrees on MD 
and MS in figure 3.20. 
 
With this, the demanded and supplied quantity decreases – compared to an evaluation-based 
expenditure sharing system. Individuals B and D prefer to demand and supply more area of 
nature conservation, but they cannot. They are bound to the collective outcome for demand and 
supply: quantity MD and MS. Since they have to demand and to supply the lower quantity, which 
they would voluntarily never do, they are harmed. To reduce this harm, they might increase the 
demanded and supplied quality of nature conservation.  
 
As is visible in figure 3.20, the over-supply, which evolves from exogenously determined 
payments pHIGH and an evaluation-based sharing system (see figure 3.19), might be reduced to 
the difference between MD and MS, reasoned in the application of a non-evaluation-based sharing 
system. 
 
Depending on the applied sharing systems, both the following results are possible when higher 
exogenous payments are determined: interacting collectives might be confronted with either an 
over-demand (see figure 3.21), 𝑀𝐷 > 𝑀𝑆, or an over-supply (see figure 3.20), 𝑀𝐷 < 𝑀𝑆. In each 
collective, individuals exist that are definitely dissatisfied with the collective outcome. They 
prefer to demand and supply higher quantities of nature conservation (assuming that an 
increase in implementation of nature conservation is the item of collective choice). Since 
collective outcome for demand and supply is determined by the individual with the lowest 
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demand and supply for nature conservation (see Buchanan 1999b: 148), the collective outcomes 
in figure 3.20 reflect the preferences of A and E. Although this collective demand might not be 
met and satisfied in quantity and quality by the collective supply, individuals A and D have no 
incentive to change their choice and to choose a less preferred alternative. If they changed their 
choice, they would harm themselves. 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Payments and a Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing System (Variant I) 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Payments and a Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing System (Variant II) 
 
 
Leaving the expenditure and revenue sharing systems unchanged (regardless of whether an 
evaluation-based or non-evaluation-based sharing system is applied) and the individuals shares 
change proportionally to the change of exogenously determined payments, the general 
implication is: higher (lower) payments compared to equilibrium payments result in lower 
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(higher) individual and collective demand and higher (lower) individual and collective supply of 
area of nature conservation. 
 
Since collectives differ with regard to their members’ preferences and their collective 
equilibrium Iagg, the same height of exogenously determined expenditures and revenues can 
result in both, in a collective over-demand and in an over-supply, although the applied sharing 
systems are equal. 
 
Whether single individuals perceive the implementation of nature conservation as an over–
demand or an over-supply depends on a comparison of their own preferred demanded 
(supplied) quantity with the collectively provided (demanded) quantity of nature conservation.  
 
 
3.5.2.2 Exogenously Determined Quantities 
 
3.5.2.2.1 Evaluation-Based Sharing System 
 
When nature conservation is implemented by coercion, not only do exogenously given payments 
need to be considered, but exogenously determined quantities as well.  
 
 
Figure 3.22: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Quantities MLOW and an Evaluation-Based Sharing System 
 
 
Again these quantities can be lower (MLOW – see figure 3.22) or higher (MHIGH – see figure 3.23) 
compared to the equilibrium quantity MI. Both of these figures show two collectives of two 
individuals each with different preferences.   
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Figure 3.23: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation with Exogenously Determined 
Quantities MHIGH and an Evaluation-Based Sharing System 
 
 
If the exogenously determined quantity is smaller (MLOW) than the equilibrium one MI, the 
quantity is demanded at total expenditures TE that exceed the necessary revenues for ensuring 
the supply of the determined quantity TR. Since the necessary payments of the demand side 
exceed the one of the supply side, an expenditure surplus evolves 𝑇𝐸 > 𝑇𝑅 – a surplus that can be 
used differently: either for implementing other collective goods or for increasing the quality of 
the implemented quantity of nature conservation. 
 
A higher exogenous determined quantity MHIGH implies that again two different heights of 
expenditures and revenues exist, but the last exceeds the previous one 𝑇𝐸 < 𝑇𝑅 . In this case, the 
determined quantity shall be implemented with a budget that might be much smaller compared 
to the one ensuring voluntary supply. Obviously this has consequences for the characteristics of 
the implemented quantity of the good “nature conservation”. The determined quantity will be 
supplied, but with decreasing quality – compared to the quality at the equilibrium Iagg. 
 
In both cases, the single individual chooses his best alternative – according to the individual 
demand and supply curve. With this, no dissatisfaction should evolve. Nevertheless, property 
rights are not efficiently allocated. This results in increasing (decreasing) quality since the same 
quantity of nature conservation can be implemented with lower (higher) expenditures 
(revenues). Although each individual pays and receives the preferred expenditure or revenue 
share, the final quality changes.  
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3.5.2.2.2 Changing Number of Demanders and Suppliers 
 
If the number of suppliers (or demanders) changes, the budget surplus (see figure 3.22) and 
budget deficit (see figure 3.23) change as well. If the exogenous determined quantity MLOW is 
smaller than the equilibrium one MI and the number of demanders decreases (𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆), the 
budget surplus will decline and will turn into a budget deficit. If the exogenous determined 
quantity MHIGH is larger than the equilibrium one, and the number of demanders decreases 
(𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆), the budget deficit will augment.  
 
If the number of suppliers reduces (𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆), the previous budget surplus increases (in the case 
of MLOW) and the previous budget deficit decreases and might turn into a budget surplus (in the 
case of MHIGH). The following table can be drawn: 
 
Table 3.3: Budget Situation when Demanders (Suppliers) are a Subset of the Suppliers (Demanders) and 
Different Quantities of Nature Conservation are Exogenously Determined 
 𝐶𝐷 ⊃ 𝐶𝑆 𝐶𝐷 ⊂ 𝐶𝑆 
MLOW Increasing budget surplus Decreasing budget surplus 
MHIGH Decreasing budget deficit Increasing budget deficit 
 
 
An increasing (decreasing) budget surplus and a decreasing (increasing) budget deficit results in 
an augmenting (reducing) quality of nature conservation. 
 
 
3.5.2.2.3 Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing System 
 
If a non-evaluation-based expenditure and revenue sharing system is given and equal 
expenditure and revenue shares are applied (Qa = Qb = Pd = Pe; see figure 3.24), the quantity-
share-relationship deviates from the individual relationship that is illustrated with the demand 
and supply curve. For some individuals, the determined expenditure or revenue share lies above 
the demand and supply curve, for others below: when considering the demand side, individual A 
(B) has to pay more (less) for the quantity MLOW compared to voluntarily demanded quantities. 
On the supply side, individual D (E) receives higher (lower) shares compared to the height at 
which he would voluntarily supply nature conservation area. To keep a balanced budget and if a 
non-evaluation-based sharing system is applied, one individual receives more, the other one has 
to receive less. With this, some individuals are harmed and others benefit – reasoned in the 
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application of expenditure and revenue sharing systems that are not related to individual 
preference, but determine equal share-quantity-relationships to the collective’s members. Those 
who are harmed (individuals A and E) reduce the quality of demanded and supplied nature 
conservation. Even the quality of already existing nature conservation can decrease. Those who 
benefit (individuals B and D) will increase the quality of nature conservation.  
 
 
Figure 3.24: Collective Demand and Collective Supply of Nature Conservation when Quantities are 
Exogenously Determined and a Non-Evaluation-Based Sharing System is Applied 
 
 
3.5.2.3 Exogenously Payments-Quantity-Relationships 
 
Either whole collectives or single members of a collective are confronted with exogenously 
determined payments-quantity-relationships. The second possibility again solely depends on the 
applied expenditure and revenue sharing system. If these sharing systems do not meet 
individual valuations, single individuals either benefit or are discriminated against. The results 
of sections 3.5.2.1 and 3.5.2.2 are applicable.  
 
If the whole collective is faced with a determined payments-quantity-relationship that exceeds 
the vertically aggregated preferences (Dagg and Sagg), even evaluation-based sharing systems do 
not suffice to demand or supply the preset quantities at the preset height of payments. Again the 
question of distribution of necessary additional expenditures and revenues among members of 
the collective evolves. Either every single member will pay or receive an additional share (that 
might have the same height or not), or the additional expenditure and revenue shares are shared 
only among some members of the collective.  
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Exogenously determined payments-quantity-relationships are not necessarily perceived as 
disadvantageous by members of the collective since some collective’s members might receive 
higher payments (or have to make lower expenditures), compared to their individual demand 
and supply curves. But this is obviously dependent on the applied sharing systems. 
 
 
3.5.3 Collective Demand – Individual Supply and Individual Demand – Collective Supply 
 
In considering the following organizational arrangements, a combination of the results of 
sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 will be captured again.  
 
 
3.5.3.1 Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing System 
 
Exogenously determined payments, quantities and payments-quantity-relationships have the 
following unambiguous implications if either demanders or suppliers form a collective and the 
respective counterpart does not: 
 Higher payments pHIGH compared to equilibrium payments result in an over-supply. 
 Lower payments pLOW imply an over-demand. 
 Higher quantities MHIGH result in a budget deficit. 
 Lower quantities MLOW imply a budget surplus. 
 If single individuals are demanders, determined quantity-payments-relationships imply 
either increasing demand for the quality of the amount of nature conservation (if the 
relationship is located below individual demand curves) or decreasing quality (if the 
relationship is located above the demand curve).  
 If single individuals are suppliers, a determined payments-quantity-relationship that lays 
above the individual supply curve will result in an increase in quality of nature conservation. 
If the relationship is located below the individual supply curve, a decreasing quality of 
provided nature conservation will result. 
 
Although every individual choice is represented by the unanimously chosen collective outcome 
and the individuals are satisfied with their choice and have no incentive to change their choice, 
the above listed results occur: over-demand and over-supply, budget deficit and surplus, and 
changing quality. 
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3.5.3.2 Non-Evaluation-Based Expenditure Sharing System 
 
Non-evaluation-based sharing systems with a fixed height of expenditure and revenue shares 
result in the fact that some individuals of the demanding (or supplying) collective are confronted 
with a lower share, some with a higher one – compared to the evaluation-based sharing systems 
and compared to their individual demand and supply curves. Compared to the evaluation-based 
sharing system of section 3.5.3.1,  
 pHIGH results in an increase in over-supply. 
 pLOW results in a reduction in over-demand. 
 pHIGH implies a reduction in over-supply. 
 pLOW implies an augmenting over-demand. 
 
In general, MHIGH implies a budget deficit and MLOW results in a budget surplus, regardless of the 
organizational arrangement: 𝐶𝐷 and 𝐼𝑆 or 𝐼𝐷 and 𝐶𝑆. If total expenditure equals total budget, 
individual shares within the collective have to be adapted. This again raises the question of the 
expenditure and revenue sharing system. If MHIGH is determined and no budget deficit occurs, 
then the collective’s members (whether all or not) have to pay more than they would prefer, or 
the suppliers will receive less (resulting in decreasing quality). If the case of MLOW is considered, 
either demanders pay less or suppliers will receive more (implying increasing quality). 
 
Exogenously determined quantities cause, as in section 3.5.3.1, changes in the quality of the 
implemented nature conservation. Either an increase in quality (if individual have to pay less or 
receive more compared to their individual demand and supply curves) or a reduction in quality 
(if individuals have to pay more or receive less compared to their individual demand and supply 
curves) can be expected.  
 
 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
 
I will highlight three findings: 
(1) Exogenously determined payments, quantities and payments-quantity-relationships have 
the same result, independent of whether individuals or collectives choose and interact. With 
this, unambiguous propositions can be made: 
  
𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐷 and 𝐼𝑆 
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐷 and 𝐶𝑆 
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 pHIGH results in over-supply. 
 pLOW results in over-demand. 
 MHIGH implies budget-deficit. 
 MLOW implies budget-surplus. 
 Fixed payments-quantity-relationships might increase or decrease the quality of 
implemented nature conservation. 
 
(2) Even if demanding and supplying collectives are confronted with exogenous payments and 
an evaluation-based expenditure sharing system, the choosing individuals are completely 
satisfied since their own choice is represented by collective outcome. With this, over-supply 
or over-demand evolves although individuals are satisfied with their choice. Single 
individuals have no incentive to choose another quantity at the given share. Otherwise they 
would be in a disadvantageous position compared to other individuals of the collective. 
 
(3) If nature conservation is demanded and supplied collectively and no evaluation-based 
sharing system is applied, no unambiguous propositions can be made. Not all individual 
choices are reflected by collective outcome, but all members of the collective have to accept 
it. As a result, the collectively agreed quantity will be demanded or supplied, but with 
different preferred qualities. Those who benefit (are harmed) from collective outcome 
would increase (decrease) the quality. 
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3.6 Confiscation of Property Rights for the Purpose of Nature Conservation 
 
I will consider two cases in the following:  
1. pHIGH can be higher than individual prohibitive payments, pHIGH > pp. Demanders have to pay 
an amount pHIGH for a quantity of the good "nature conservation" at which they would never 
demand this good. This results in coerced financing and coerced consumption of nature 
conservation. 
2. pLOW might be zero. The demander does not have to pay anything, the supplier receives no 
revenues. With this, suppliers are coerced to provide property rights for nature conservation 
at payments at which they voluntarily would never agree to do so. In this case, individuals 
are confronted with coerced supply.  
 
Reasoned in a better illustration of the intersections points at pLOW and pHIGH, the illustrations of 
the demand and supply curve in figure 3.25 and 3.26 are not limited to the first quadrant but are 
extended by the second one. 
 
 
3.6.1 Individual Demand and Individual Supply 
 
3.6.1.1 Coerced Supply 
 
If expenditure is zero, demanders choose their satiation level of property rights for nature 
conservation SL in figure 3.25. Suppliers that are confronted with revenues equal zero choose SV 
and do not provide additional nature conservation. They rather prefer to reduce the area that is 
already allocated to nature conservation to the level SV, which is located on the negative side of 
the abscissa. The supply of additional land on which one property right is allocated to nature 
conservation, for instance the amount SL at revenues equal zero, is only possible when the 
supply of this good is coerced. At the height of payments 𝑝𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 0, individuals would never 
supply quantity SL' of property rights for nature conservation. Suppliers would voluntarily 
provide the satiation level SL (that is marked as SL’ in figure 3.25) of demanders at the revenues 
of pSL’. 
 
As a consequence, the supplier’s producer surplus is negative and amounts to the whole area 
below the supply curve, SVSLSL'. Since the producer surplus is negative, the individual is 
harmed.  
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Demanders receive a huge consumer surplus, namely the area below the demand curve. No 
budget is necessary for receiving and implementing the good "nature conservation". 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Individual Demand and Individual Supply of Nature Conservation with Coerced Financing and 
Coerced Supply 
 
 
3.6.1.2 Coerced Demand 
 
Demanding nature conservation at expenditures higher than prohibitive payments pHIGH in figure 
3.25 implies coerced financing and coerced consumption of this good. At this expenditure, 
individuals would demand zero (or negative) property rights for nature conservation DV. With 
this, demanding individuals have to accept and consume the supplied nature conservation DL. 
These demanders have to (1) finance and with this provide the necessary budget for a quantity 
of nature conservation they voluntarily would never do and, further, (2) consume this supplied 
amount of nature conservation. 
 
The supplier obtains a positive producer surplus and the demander receives a negative 
consumer surplus (the area above the demand curve) and is therefore harmed. 
 
 
3.6.2 Collective Demand and Collective Supply 
 
Either (1) the whole collective of individuals with different preferences is confronted with 
confiscation or (2) confiscation results from the applied expenditure and revenue sharing 
systems and, with this, only single members of the collective are confronted with takings. 
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If the first is the case, the conclusions from the previous section 3.6.1 can be transferred to the 
collective since either the whole demanding or the whole supplying collective is confronted with 
takings. The only difference is that varying satiation levels, different prohibitive payments and, 
on the supply side, different chosen quantities at revenues equal zero exist, which are 
aggregated to one collective outcome. This results in different heights of harm (negative 
consumer surplus and negative producer surplus).  
 
In the second case, the expenditure and revenue sharing system can be designed differently, as 
figure 3.26 shows. The illustrated total expenditure and total revenue sharing effects (with 
TE = TR), that: 
 
 Individual A with shares equal zero demands the satiation level SLA. This implies that 
individual B is confronted with expenditures at the height of DVB and therefore with coerced 
financing and coerced consumption. It is 𝑆𝐿𝐴 + 𝐷𝑉𝐵 = 𝑇𝐸. 
 Individual D is confronted with revenue shares equal zero and individual E receives SVE. It is 
𝑆𝑉𝐷 + 𝑆𝑉𝐸 = 𝑇𝑅 . 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Coerced Implementation of Nature Conservation with Collective Demand and Collective Supply 
 
 
If expenditures and revenues are shared among the collective’s members in a way that a 
discrimination of payments and a perceived coercion of some individuals evolve (see figure 
3.26), the chosen quantity (and as well quality) depends on the applied voting rule. If a 
unanimity voting rule was agreed on constitutionally, always the lowest (highest) amount will 
be chosen on the demand side and on the supply side when an increase (reduction) in nature 
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conservation is considered. When suppliers are confronted with takings, they would agree on 
SVD, and if the demanders are coerced they would have choose DVB.  
 
This result changes if single majority voting was chosen and the majority of the demanders are 
confronted with expenditures equal zero and the majority of suppliers with revenues equal zero. 
The implication of this situation is a large deviation between the demanded quantity and the 
quantity the suppliers would provide voluntarily. Suppliers are coerced into suppling the 
demanded quantity, but as an answer to applied coercion, they will reduce the quality of 
implementation. This can be transferred to the demanders’ reaction when they are confronted 
with coerced financing and coerced consumption.  
 
 
3.6.3 Collective Demand with Individual Supply and Individual Supply with Collective Demand 
 
When organizational arrangements between collectives and individuals are chosen, the result of 
takings equals those which are illustrated in the previous sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.  
 
 
3.6.4 Conclusion 
 
The application of coercion for implementing nature conservation – either coerced financing and 
coerced consumption or coerced provision – results in an increasing deviation between 
demanded and supplied quantities. Suppliers who are confronted with revenues equal zero 
prefer to reduce the area that is already allocated for nature conservation purposes. According 
to this, applying takings to suppliers leads to a reduction in the already voluntarily preserved 
area – in quantity and/or quality. On the other side, if demanders are confronted with takings, 
they would demand less nature conservation in quantity and quality. They demand a reduction 
in the quality of the already preserved land. 
 
These unambiguous implications of applied coercion disappear if the whole demanding or 
supplying collective is not confronted with coercion, but – reasoned in the applied expenditure 
and revenue sharing system – only some of the collective’s members.  
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3.7 Incomplete Information 
 
In markets, we can observe individual choices and make conclusions on individual preferences 
and individual evaluation. This is not possible while considering collective choices. When I 
receive one collective outcome that is expressed, I have no information on: 
 The process of generating this outcome (for instance the decision-making rule). 
 The number of individuals whose preferences are reflected by collective outcome. 
 
If the rule of unanimity is applied, collective outcome reflects the individual that demands (or 
supplies) the lowest amount for an increase in nature conservation at the applied expenditure or 
revenue sharing system. I have no information on the number of individuals who would agree on 
this quantity. Further I do not know how many individuals would demand the various other 
quantities of nature conservation area. 
 
In the previous illustrations I always draw demand and supply curves of the collective's 
members. But I do not know these curves. I only receive the outcome of the collective choice, 
namely point MD for the demanding collective and point MS for the supplying collective in figure 
3.27. Everything else remains imprecise. 
 
With this, the preferences of the collective's members remain a black-box. This obviously has 
consequences for the adjustment of sharing-systems. An adaptation of these sharing systems is 
similar to haphazard sharing.  
 
 
Figure 3.27: Received Information – the Outcome of a Collective Choice  
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3.8 Results 
 
3.8.1 Preference Order of Institutional Arrangements 
 
When considering individual perspective on the institutional arrangements "voluntary 
exchange", "eminent domain" and "confiscation", the following preference order can be 
elaborated, based on the illustration in figure 3.28. Reasoned in a better illustration of the 
intersection points of payments equal zero or higher than prohibitive payments with the 
demand and supply curves, the graphs – previously limited on the first quadrant – are extended 
by the second quadrant. 
 
 
Figure 3.28: Confronting an Individual Demander and an Individual Supplier with the Previously Analyzed 
Institutions for Implementing Nature Conservation 
 
 
The marked points illustrate the consequences of the applied institutions, regardless of choosing 
individually or collectively: 
 A and A': property rights of suppliers are confiscated. 
 B: voluntary exchange. 
 C and C': property rights of demanders are confiscated. 
 D: eminent domain with higher payments. 
 E: eminent domain with lower payments. 
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From the demanders’ point of view, the following order can be written: 
𝐴 ≻ 𝐸 ≻ 𝐵 ≻ 𝐷 ≻ 𝐶 
 
The suppliers prefer the following order: 
𝐶′ ≻ 𝐷 ≻ 𝐵 ≻ 𝐸 ≻ 𝐴′ 
 
These orders are based on different heights of consumer and producer surplus, if different 
institutional arrangements have been applied. This illustration of individual benefit or harm is a 
consistent and strict application of methodological individualism. In applying a criteria of social 
welfare maximization, I would leave the individualistic level of consideration and examine the 
aggregated macroeconomic level.  
 
According to the elaborated preference orders of demanders and suppliers of nature 
conservation, most individuals prefer confiscation, but only if they benefit from the application 
of takings to other individuals. At least they favor being confronted themselves with the 
institution of confiscation. Takings imply the highest damage to individuals who are confronted 
with them. 
 
The placement of eminent domain in this preference order is not unambiguous. It depends on 
the applied sharing systems and with this on the share the individual has to pay or receives. If 
demanders have to pay less (E) for the same quantity and quality of nature conservation, they 
would prefer eminent domain to voluntary exchange. If they have to pay more (D) for the same 
quantity and quality of nature conservation, they would prefer voluntary exchanges to eminent 
domain. 
 
Reasoned in the above written preference orders of demanders and suppliers, the chosen 
institutional arrangement of confiscation for solely implementing the good "nature 
conservation" cannot be the result of a unanimously made collective choice.  
 
If only the good "nature conservation" is considered, the application of confiscation for 
increasing the nature conservation area – in the sense that a property right of suppliers is 
confiscated – might be reasoned in the applied voting rule. If single majority voting was 
constitutionally chosen and applied, the chosen institutional arrangement of confiscation can 
only be determined by a voting collective in which the individuals who are suppliers form the 
minority. This is valid regardless of individual or collective demand and supply. The outcome of 
collective choice that determines the institutional arrangement is defined by the individuals of 
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the collective that solely demand nature conservation at an individual tax share equal zero. They 
would present the majority. Based on this thought I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 8:  
If the implementation of nature conservation implies the allocation of one property right for the 
purpose of nature conservation that is owned and used by a majority of the choosing collective, 
the institutional arrangement of confiscation is not expected to be chosen, ceteris paribus. Other 
institutional arrangements (e.g. voluntary exchange) will be applied. 
 
If I consider one property right, for instance an access right that is abandoned for nature 
conservation purposes, the applied institutional arrangement might differ. An area – worth 
protecting from the perspective of nature conservation – that is accessed by a minority 
(majority) of the collective that determines the institutional arrangement can be preserved by 
confiscation (voluntary exchange or eminent domain).  
 
 
3.8.2 The Influence of Institutional and Organizational Arrangements on the Implementation 
of Nature Conservation 
 
The following table 3.4 concludes the results of the analysis in this chapter. It illustrates that, 
although the considered individuals remain unchanged, the application of different 
organizational and institutional arrangements and the unanimity voting rule will result in 
varying implementation of nature conservation. Deviations from the equilibrium quantity and 
payments are pointed out. The implementation of nature conservation is represented by the 
area on which one property right is allocated to conservation purposes. It becomes obvious that 
only in very few cases (shaded in red), ambiguous propositions about the influence on the 
implementation of nature conservation can be made. The green shaded cells illustrate 
combinations that allow clear propositions on the implementation of nature conservation. 
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Organizational  
Arrangements 
 
Institutional  
Arrangements 
Individual 
Demand and 
Individual 
Supply 
Collective Demand and Collective 
Supply 
Collective Demand and Individual 
Supply 
Individual Demand and Collective 
Supply 
Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Non-Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Non-Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Non-Evaluation-
Based Sharing 
Voluntary Exchange 
equilibrium 
quantity and 
payments 
equilibrium 
quantity and 
payments 
voluntary 
exchange fails  
equilibrium 
quantity and 
payments 
voluntary 
exchange fails  
equilibrium 
quantity and 
payments 
voluntary 
exchange fails  
Eminent 
Domain with 
Exogenously 
Determined 
Higher 
Payments 
over-supply over-supply 
over-demand or 
over-supply 
over-supply over-supply over-supply 
over-demand or 
over-supply 
Lower 
Payments 
over-demand over-demand 
over-demand or 
over-supply 
over-demand over-demand over-demand over-demand 
Higher 
Quantity 
budget  
deficit 
budget  
deficit 
harmed 
individuals 
decrease quality, 
benefiting ones 
increase quality 
budget  
deficit 
budget deficit; 
balanced budget 
results in 
decreasing quality 
budget  
deficit 
budget deficit; 
balanced budget 
implies decreasing 
quality 
Lower 
Quantity 
budget 
surplus 
budget 
surplus 
harmed 
individuals 
decrease quality, 
benefiting ones 
increase quality 
budget 
surplus 
budget surplus; 
balanced budget 
results in 
increasing quality 
budget 
surplus 
budget surplus; 
balanced budget 
implies increasing 
quality 
Payments-
Quantity-
Relationship 
harmed individuals decrease quality, benefiting ones increase quality 
Confiscation 
with Payments 
Larger than 
Prohibitive 
Payments 
coerced financing and coerced consumption – a coerced quantity is demanded but at a reduced quality, either by the whole 
collective (if the whole demanding collective is confronted with takings) or by single individuals (reasoned in the individual 
demand or the applied expenditure sharing system) 
Equal Zero 
coerced supply – a coerced quantity is supplied but at a reduced quality, either by the whole collective (if the whole supplying 
collective is confronted with takings) or by single individuals (reasoned in the individual supply or the applied revenue sharing 
system) 
Table 3.4: Deviations from a Quantity-Payments-Equilibrium and Implications on the Implemented Quantity and Quality of Nature Conservation when Different 
Institutional and Organizational Arrangements and the Rule of Unanimity are Applied
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4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
4.1 Economics and Social Interaction in the Field of Nature Conservation 
 
The application of methodological individualism (Blankart 2006: 12) in combination with the 
concept of homo economicus as a rational, self-interested individual (Homan & Suchanek 2005: 
364) or in his advancement as a resourceful, evaluating, maximizing man (called REMM) (Jensen 
& Meckling 1994) that has to choose one of diverse alternatives according to his own 
preferences and constraints (Kirchgässner 2008: 12) may require some argumentation.  
 
(1) As Aligica (2009: 54) already writes, "[…] population policies and policies in general cannot be 
based on scientific studies alone. Values play an important part in this type of decision as in all 
other cases. This raises the question of how those values are incorporated in policy decisions." This 
valuation is made by humans. Of course, scientific data provide individuals with information or 
knowledge, for example the Red Lists compile endangered and threatened species. But between 
the knowledge and the action of humans there is still the individual valuation which values the 
received information and sorts it as more or less important. That these valuations can change is 
shown by Aligica (2009: 55) while describing the transformation from a human-centered 
perspective on the environment to nature-centered in one century. Using methodological 
individualism makes the following analysis independent of current trends or isms and focuses 
on an anthropocentric perspective (Haber 2008: 24; Ott 2010: 10). 
 
(2) An argument against the applied methodology could be that individuals may act as advocates 
of the environment. Even for this thought, Aligica (2009: 56) demonstrates its inconsistency in 
referring to Julian Simon's Ultimate Resource 2 (1996: 562). The aim of interest groups or 
legislators is "[…] to take money from some taxpayers in order to give it to some other persons or 
activities whom they think deserving […]" (Simon 1996: 562) and "[…] doing good without having 
sacrifice from your own pocket to pay for it. This is often seen in initiatives labelled as 'saving the 
environment'[…]” (Simon 1996: 562). Transmitting this thought to the issue of nature 
conservation means that individuals who are engaging in preserving species or habitats and 
acting as "advocates" of the environment may change their opinion and act differently if they 
faced different constraints, for example higher payments. I would like to apply the following 
example: let us assume a landowner who is interested in designating a wilderness area. What 
will happen if he has to provide part of his own property for this wilderness area or, to put it 
more clearly, that all of his property is designated as wilderness area? Maybe he will continue to 
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engage in the designation of wilderness area, maybe he will not and take an opposite position. In 
the second case, the advocate of the environment would be greatly weakened and the concept 
fails since the "interest of the environment – the implementation of wilderness areas" is opposed 
to the landowner's interest. Therefore, I prefer to understand individuals as acting units that 
choose their action according to individual valuations based on their own preferences and the 
relevant constraints.  
 
(3) Bringing in the argument that many individuals might behave rather altruistically than 
according to the concept of homo economicus18. Assuming that all individuals behave 
altruistically, the implied thoughts and expectations would differ from those of assuming all 
individuals behaving rationally (and not including the wellbeing of others as a part of their 
individual utility function). If I assume that individuals behave altruistically, I do not allow for 
egoistic behavior and would be considerably surprised about the “worse” result or higher losses 
and damage. That is a further reason for me to consider human beings as egoistic individuals 
since such unpleasant surprises will not happen, which is better (from my point of view) than 
ignoring that individuals could behave in this way and with this underestimating the possible 
losses (Brennan & Buchanan 2000: 61ff.; Homann & Suchanek 2005: 371). Brennan & Buchanan 
(2000: 62) conclude that “The model of self-interest, or homo economicus will tip the balance of 
argument in favor of assigning less discretionary power to political agents than would be the case 
under the benevolence model.”  
 
The construction of homo economicus describes no real human being since every human being 
cannot be reduced to simply one model, be that homo economicus or another one. But the 
application of this model can depict human behavior in dilemma structures and can form the 
basis for overcoming them (Homann & Suchanek 2005: 412). 
 
(4) Even when considering collectives, methodological individualism has its justification since 
collectives do not exist independent from their members (Brennan & Buchanan 2000: 27)19. 
Individuals make choices independent of being in a market or political exchange. Buchanan 
(1987: 245) states that “The individual that chooses between apples and oranges remains the 
same person who choose between the levers marked ‘Candidate A’ and ‘Candidate B’ in the polling 
both. “  
                                                          
18 Wasmuth (1979: 11) in contrast argued that altruistic behavior can be included in the concept of homo 
economicus since individuals can also gain pleasure reasoned in the wellbeing of others. 
 
19 See Brennan & Buchanan (2000: 27): “[…] the state does not exist as an organic entity independent of the 
individuals in the polity. The state does not act as such, and it cannot seek its own ends or objectives.” 
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Since I understand nature conservation as an economic (Menger 1871: 3) and normal good 
(Kahn & Matsusaka 1997: 14020; Rothenberg 2002: 5), standard economic models of demand 
and supply can be applied. In addition, an exchange of this good based on mutual agreement is 
achieved in both of the institutions, market and politics, and is not reserved solely to market 
exchange. Further, since collectives are constituted by individuals, the subjective choice of each 
individual regarding demand and supply of nature conservation forms the basis for collective 
choices according to constitutionally chosen decision-making rules. 
 
 
4.2 Reducing Decision-Making Costs 
 
The model I applied for analyzing demand and supply of nature conservation is that of a direct 
democracy. Furthermore, collective choices are based on the rule of unanimity. Obviously, this 
model neglects evolving decision-making costs and is far away from the reality I experience in 
everyday life. Nevertheless, this model of a direct democracy helped me to gain insights into the 
structure of implementing nature conservation collectively. I will introduce two possibilities for 
reducing these decision-making costs: (1) the constitutional choice of an alternative voting rule 
(for instance single majority voting) and (2) transition into a representative democracy. 
 
 
4.2.1 Alternative Voting Rules 
 
At this point, I will focus on the importance of voting rules for determining collective outcomes 
in the field of nature conservation. In the illustration (figure 4.1) that I already applied in section 
3.5.2.1 (figure 3.20), the individuals would unanimously choose MD as demanding quantity and 
MS as supplying quantity. Assuming now that individuals A, B, D, and E represent not only one 
single individual, but a group of: A = 10 individual; B = 20 individuals; D = 30 individuals and 
E = 20 individuals. Further the single majority voting for determining collective outcomes was 
chosen constitutionally. If the majority determines the collective outcome, MD’ and MS’ would 
have been chosen instead. With this, collective outcome represents the preferences the majority 
of the choosing individuals have. No information is transmitted on other preferences, for 
instance whether higher or lower quantities are preferred, and on the number of individuals 
whose preferences are not represented by collective outcome. 
                                                          
20 To be more precise, Kahn & Matsusaka (1997: 140) found that the environment is a normal good at 
mean income level and an inferior good at the highest income levels (especially when parklands are 
considered). Buchanan (1964: 234) adds that the height of income is not the only determinant of 
evaluation of (public) goods, but have nevertheless a large explanatory power. 
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Figure 4.1: Collectively Chosen Quantities of Nature Conservation when Different Decision-Making Rules are 
Applied 
 
 
4.2.2 Representatives 
 
I have so far neglected that choices on nature conservation are not always made in a direct form. 
Choices are not made by the whole collective, but by some previously chosen individuals who 
represent the collective with their made choices. Either these collective's representatives are 
elected (as members of parliaments are) in recurring elections, or they are recruited 
independently of elections (as most bureaucrats are). In the applied model of a direct democracy 
I do not have to include representatives or bureaucrats with several patterns of action.  
 
Even transition from a direct democracy to a representative one requires the collective's choice. 
A representative form is chosen if the information and decision-making costs of a direct 
democracy are valued higher than the resulting consequences of the representatives’ choice. 
“The costs of decision-making become too large relative to the possible reductions in expected 
external costs that collective action might produce.” (Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 212). With the 
acceptance of the fact that the outcomes of the representative's choices do not always 
correspond with individual preferences, the individual is confronted with reduced 
interdependence costs for making choices (Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 212). 
 
Choosing either directly by applying a non-unanimity rule or by transferring the right to choose 
on nature conservation onto representatives may result in a collective outcome that does not 
correspond with the individual's preferences on nature conservation, but also implies reduced 
costs to individuals who are inherent in direct democratic (unanimous) choice making. 
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(Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 99 and 212). With this, direct democracies with non-unanimity-
decision-making-rules and representative democratic systems have similar structures. 
 
With the agreement on a representative democracy, the collective right of choice-making is 
transferred from “[…] a one-to-one correspondence.” (Buchanan & Tullock 1999: 212), in which 
every individual is represented by one representative, namely by himself, to one or a group of 
individuals who will choose for the whole collective and being a member of the collective. The 
right to make choices that determine demand and supply of nature conservation is with this 
transferred from the whole collective to representatives and bureaucrats. Therefore, not every 
individual that is in some way interested in nature conservation can make direct choices via 
voting.  
 
Moreover, constitutional choices concerning nature conservation are transferred to 
representatives, for example the choice of institutions and of the organization of demand and 
supply.  
 
These individuals act in two roles: as a representative of the collective (be this as a member of 
parliament or a bureaucrat) and as an individual human being of the collective. Can we expect 
him to choose a quantity of nature conservation that is in the major opinion of the majority of 
the collective's members and contradicts his own preferences and objectives? I assume that 
individuals, being either elected or recruited, have individual preferences and aims they pursue, 
although being representatives of a collective. Otherwise the collective would be confronted 
with a Weber's bureaucrat (1980: 126f.) or a Pigovian representative (1929: 331ff.). The choices 
of representatives have already been characterized in Wicksell (1896: 109, translated in 
Buchanan (1987: 245)): “[…] members of the representative body are, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, precisely as interested in the general welfare as are their constituents, neither 
more nor less. “. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Elected Representatives 
 
As Downs (1968: 27f.) shows, elected representatives and parties might be interested in being 
re-elected and choose the quantity of nature conservation, the conservation objectives, for 
example species or habitats, and strategies in such a way that they increase the number of votes 
they will obtain in the next election. These are only model assumptions. Some might be deeply 
interested in nature conservation as well. But choosing representatives or parties requires 
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further criteria, such as reliability and accountability, and not only the amount of conservation 
area or the conservation objective they represent. Voters prefer to be certain that promises 
made by candidates will be kept (Downs 1968: 100ff.).  
 
Since representatives in parliaments represent the wants of voters, they represent the collective 
demand in my example of nature conservation. With this, passed acts or directives, such as the 
HD (with the species and habitats listed in Annexes I, II and IV of the directive) or the German 
Federal Nature Conservation Act (BNatSchG), can be understood as a collective demand for 
nature conservation. Even the Federal Ordinance on the Conservation of Species (BArtSchVO) 
can be listed, despite the fact that its elaboration was delegated to the executive body by 
parliament. The listing of species and habitats can be understood as a collective choice 
determining the objectives of nature conservation. 
 
Up to now I have assumed that solely the demand for the good "nature conservation" is 
expressed by representatives. But during an election, representatives do not offer only 
quantities or qualities of one good, but a basket that contains different goods with varying 
characteristics. This implies that individuals would, despite equal evaluation of nature 
conservation, vote for different candidates (although they offer equal quantities and qualities of 
nature conservation) reasoned in a deviating evaluation of other goods contained in the pre-set 
baskets. Implied by this behavior, the choices made by the elected representative on other goods 
than "nature conservation" might reflect the preferences of the voters, but the choices on nature 
conservation might not coincide. This consideration was not included in the publication by 
Potrafke (2013) who studies the transmission of voters’ preferences by representatives. 
 
The representatives’ choice for the amount of nature conservation is influenced by pressure or 
interest groups (Kosnik 2010a and 2010b) that act on and adapt to different governmental 
stages (Juerges & Newig 2015). Essi Eerola (2004) presents a model that explains the influence 
of an industrial and an environmental lobby on the strictness of forest conservation policies. 
Ando (1999) and Kosnik (2006) show empirically that the duration of regulatory administrative 
processes is affected (1) by interest groups, (2) by the legislature, and (3) by bureaucratic 
discretion.  
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4.2.2.2 Bureaucrats 
 
The administrative system as an actor within the field of nature conservation (Eser 1999: 109), 
consisting of individuals who are independent of voting results (Tullock 1971), plays an 
important role during the implementation of legal, fiscal and informative instruments and, 
finally, for the implementation of nature conservation. Self-interest might be transferable to 
bureaucrats as well, but with the difference that bureaucrats are not elected (Frey & 
Kirchgässner 1994: 191). Various models exist that describe the bureaucrat as self-interested 
(Roppel 1979: 19) with different preferences and perceptions, for example “[…] salary, 
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making 
changes, and ease in managing the bureau […]” (Niskanen 1968: 293f.), and discretionary profit 
(Migué & Bélanger 1974: 30; Wyckoff 1990). Downs (1994: 88) defines five types of bureaucrats 
with different goals (climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen). Downing (1981) 
includes the environmental quality in the utility function of bureaucrats. Bernholz & Breyer 
(1994: 147) assume income, power and prestige as aims of the head of the administrative units.  
 
Although bureaucrats and members of parliament have individual preferences and perceptions, 
their choices are valid for the whole collective. The difference between the individually chosen 
quantity or objective and the collectively preferred one might be larger if the choosing individual 
is not dependent on re-election.  
 
This fact is also observable when considering the following figure 4.2. I assume that the majority 
of voters is represented by the red colored demand curve. Therefore, the elected representative 
can also be described by this curve since individuals choose the one that is closest to his own 
payments-quantity-relationship. Since bureaucrats are mainly not elected, they do not depend 
on this consideration. Therefore, their individual demand curve (green) might largely deviate 
from that of the collective's majority. 
 
Contrary to that, the process of implementation in particular is an interplay and might also be an 
agreement between local actors and members of the local or regional administrative system 
with corresponding administrative discretion. This relationship can be described by street-level 
bureaucracy, as Borrass (2014) does for implementation of the HD. With this point of view, the 
deviation between choices of bureaucrats and preferred alternatives of citizens might not be 
that large. If a bureaucrat is managing a local forest that is owned by a municipality and he 
further is also a member of the citizenry, he might deviate from his individual demand curve for 
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nature conservation since he includes the satisfaction of his neighbors or fellow citizens in his 
consideration. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Different Demand Curves for Nature Conservation of a Collective’s Members 
 
 
Maintaining differentiation in demand and supply, bureaucrats are both demanders and 
suppliers (see figure 4.3). In realizing collective demand, voiced by parliament (for example in 
the form of passed acts), they are suppliers. This is particularly understandable when 
bureaucrats represent collectively owned (land) property, as forest land managers of 
collectively owned land do (for example, forest land that is in the ownership of the state, the 
Laender or municipalities). In this position, the forest land manager provides nature 
conservation as a representative of the whole collective that is the owner of the considered land 
area. Further, bureaucrats are responsible for the implementation of acts, ordinances or 
directives and, with this, provide or achieve demanded conservation objectives. 
 
But bureaucrats might also be demanders for three reasons. Firstly, the administrative or 
executive system advises representatives of parliament and gives recommendations. With this 
they influence the final collective outcome on demand for nature conservation. Secondly, the 
simultaneous role as demanders and suppliers results from the hierarchical structure of the 
administration of nature conservation. As figure 4.3 illustrates, an administrative organization at 
the middle level is a demander of nature conservation relative to the lower administrative level 
and a supplier relative to the higher one. Thirdly, as figure 4.3 shows, bureaucrats are also 
demanders when nature conservation is considered on individually owned land. 
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Figure 4.3: Coincidence of the Bureaucrats’ Role of Being Demanders D and Suppliers S 
 
 
The implementation of nature conservation by the administrative system is not free, but 
requires a budget that is confirmed by parliament. The considered administrative unit receives 
this budget and chooses the amount and/or quality he is willing to provide. With this, one 
preferred amount of land allocated to nature conservation will be realized, although the citizens 
in the considered region might prefer different ones. If nature conservation can be implemented 
by different administrative organizations, competition for the budget evolves. This competition 
takes place among the bureaucrats (and with this representatives) of either one and the same 
collective (and different administrative organizations or different organizational levels) or 
among bureaucrats of different collectives (but the same administrative levels).  
 
Bureaucrats within administrative organizations do not only demand and supply, but also co–
ordinate or merge expressed demand and supply. If nature conservation measures are 
demanded and financed with subsidies, bureaucrats treat applications offering voluntary supply 
of nature conservation based on the offered conditions of the funding guideline. If grants are 
exhausted and still applications are filed, this implies that more individuals of the society would 
voluntarily exchange and with this provide nature conservation under these conditions.  
  
D 
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4.3 Illustrative Examples and Consequences of the Applied Institution 
 
Observation of practical nature conservation shows that some institutional and organizational 
arrangements dominate implementation of conservation aims. These arrangements shall be 
discussed in the light of the results of the previous analysis. To link the examples with the results 
of the analysis, I apply the following figure 4.4, which I already used slightly modified in chapter 
3.8.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Confronting Demanders and Suppliers with the Previously Analyzed Institutions for Implementing 
Nature Conservation 
 
 
4.3.1 Voluntary Exchange 
 
Voluntary exchanges do exist in practical nature conservation although, I assume, they are not as 
apparent as legal regulations and funding guidelines are (Kirchgässner & Schneider 2003). 
Voluntary contractual nature conservation in the understanding of a voluntary mutual 
beneficiary exchange (Güthler 2003: 87ff.; Güthler et al. 2005: preface) is an example of an 
exchange between nature conservation administrations and members of society –they might be 
single individuals or collectives. Voluntary exchange is illustrated as point B in figure 4.4. This 
structure of exchange is not only possible between local authorities (street-level bureaucrats) 
and landowners or individuals/collectives, but also between different administrative levels: 
supranational, national, regional, local levels, and municipalities. If collectives are considered as 
demander and/or suppliers, a voluntary agreement at point B in figure 4.4 can only be obtained 
if evaluation-based revenue and expenditure sharing systems are applied.   
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Contractual nature conservation focuses on voluntary supply of nature conservation. Financing 
based on funding guidelines that are available only for owners of land that is located in 
designated areas (see Güthler et al. 2005: 117) and is part of specific regional scenarios neglects 
the voluntary aspect of these exchanges. This kind of financing does not differ from 
compensation, as illustrated in the following section 4.3.2. With the combination of legally 
protected conservation areas and funding guidelines, moving from point A’ to either point B or D 
or E takes place. Only by coincidence, point B will be obtained by the exogenously determined 
height of payments. As a consequence, this structure of supplying nature conservation is not a 
voluntary exchange but rather an eminent domain. In addition to that, the possibility of 
supplying voluntary nature conservation is reduced to a limited group of landowners, namely 
those whose property is already designated and has conservation status. As a result, on non-
designated property, no conservation measures are supplied when this kind of understanding of 
"contractual nature conservation" is applied. 
 
But administrative agencies do not have to always be involved when nature conservation is 
voluntarily exchanged. A simple everyday example of a mutual beneficiary exchange between 
individuals might be the following case: one individual (K) owns forest land, the other individual 
(L) has an orchard with apple and pear varieties. (K) installs nesting boxes and is paid by (L) 
with fruits or (K) receives permission (and with this the property right) to harvest apples. 
Another possibility is that (L) maintains the fruit trees on the meadow orchard and (K) gives 
him firewood in return. Point B in figure 4.4 illustrates this mutual beneficiary exchange. This 
structure of exchange can be transferred to collectives as well, for instance an exchange between 
a nature conservation association and a hunting or tourism association or collective forest 
owners such as municipalities. 
 
In this sense, payments are made for the environmental services "biodiversity" and "nature 
conservation". With this, voluntary exchanges are based on payments for environmental 
services (PES; OECD 2010), whereas payments are understood as property rights (not only 
monetary units) which the demander transfers to the supplier for receiving the property right 
for the good "nature conservation".  
 
Finally, individuals practice nature conservation autonomously on their property: landowners 
install nesting boxes, sow honey plants, or leave wet areas unmanaged. But not only can 
individual subsistence be found, but collective subsistence that is equal to an economic club as 
well (Buchanan 1965). Nature conservation associations purchase land and allocate this for 
conservation purposes. This subsistence economy exists since landowners voluntarily practice 
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nature conservation. Otherwise no area worth preserving would exist that could have been 
designated in the past or can be designated in the future based on legal regulations.  
 
 
4.3.2 Eminent Domain 
 
Measures for implementing nature conservation aims imply costs. Individuals in our society are 
confronted with (1) different heights of costs reasoned in a subjective valuation and (2) different 
kinds of costs (in terms of different lost alternatives). Remembering that costs comprise 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary parts, present subsidies can be discussed. These subsidies aim at 
(1) compensation of landowners for their lost property rights and (2) setting an incentive for 
landowners to supply nature conservation. 
 
With the application of funding guidelines and structural funds, exogenously determined 
pecuniary units are paid in return for supply of property rights for nature conservation. Two 
issues are necessary to consider: 
 Unique payments are made. 
 Solely pecuniary compensation is paid. 
These exogenously determined payments, made from a collectively generated budget, are made 
to individual or collective suppliers.  
 
 
4.3.2.1 Pecuniary Payments 
 
A considerable body of funding guidelines that support the implementation of conservation 
measures exists in Germany (see www.foerderdatenbank.de, provided by the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy). Mainly conservation measures are compensated, 
implemented on either individually or collectively owned land, for instance additional 
expenditures for removing non-native tree species (RL NE21 2014: measure A.4), the installation 
of nesting boxes (measure A.5), the acquisition of information about the occurrence of species 
and the quality of their habitats (measure B.2). For the implementation of the HD, the LIFE 
nature fund (Articles 3(1a) and 9(1b) of Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013) is of central 
importance for supporting management of the Natura 2000 network. For the relevant measures, 
proportional subsidies are paid. Further support is given by the European Agricultural Fund for 
                                                          
21 The Saxon funding guideline Natürliches Erbe (RL NE/2014) finances conservation and development of 
habitats and populations of wild species, based on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and regional funds of the Land Saxony. 
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Rural Development (EAFRD), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the 
European Social Fund (ESF) (EC 2015a: 14ff.). 
 
With present pecuniary compensation, only a specific group of individuals or collectives (if any) 
is compensated, namely those who practically implement conservation measures and own land. 
Individuals or collectives that are also confronted with costs, but not in terms of pecuniary 
investments, receive no compensation and are confronted with takings.  
 
The loss of other property rights is not compensated, for instance the right to hike on specific 
paths and the right to hunt in now designated wilderness areas. Although these rights cannot be 
expressed in monetary terms, compensation is possible when including the thought of 
exchanging property rights for nature conservation with other property rights.  
 
I conclude that the payments made in pecuniary units represent only a part of the height of the 
aggregated costs of nature conservation. The implication is continuous over-demand regarding 
implementation of nature conservation, which is reflected in additional site designations, the 
present political discussion for increasing wilderness areas, and initiatives to launch National 
Parks. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Unique Pecuniary Payments 
 
Even if two individuals own forest or agricultural land that is identical in site conditions and the 
individuals have equal objectives for future development of the considered land, these two 
individuals might value the occurring income losses differently. This implies that these two 
individuals would prefer different amounts of conservation area when they are confronted with 
the same height of income losses or same height of revenues. One single height of revenues for 
supplying nature conservation can only met coincidently the intersection point B in figure 4.4 of 
the demand and supply curve. Either these pecuniary revenues might be too high (point D), or 
too low (point E).  
 
If compensation is paid to a collective, the applied revenue sharing and the applied voting rule 
determine and influence the height of the chosen collective outcome. If the same height of 
compensation is paid to collectives that differ in the process of determining collective outcomes, 
different results shall be observed, as table 3.4 shows. According to table 3.4, the combination of 
collective demand and collective supply is the organizational arrangement that implies the 
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largest uncertainty regarding the finally implemented quantity and quality of nature 
conservation. 
 
An exogenous determination of a unique height of compensation implies: 
 That only those landowners supply nature conservation who benefit from the determined 
compensation. As a consequence, these are landowners that have lower or equal costs and 
can express them in monetary units (see points B and D in figure 4.4). 
 That individuals, who voluntarily would supply nature conservation (even without being 
compensated by others), apply for compensation. Obviously, for these landowners the 
compensation is no incentive to increase the height of supplied nature conservation. 
 That landowners, who already have high conservation status and are confronted with 
relatively low additional costs for increasing the conservation status and have high 
preferences for nature conservation, are reached by compensation. 
 That landowners, who are confronted with high additional costs, reasoned in the fact that (1) 
they have not practiced nature conservation before, (2) they are confronted with very high-
income losses reasoned in reduced harvesting activities, or (3) have low preferences for 
nature conservation, might not be reached with the determined height of payments (see 
point E in figure 4.4). 
 
As a consequence, nature conservation will only be additionally supplied by landowners that are 
confronted with costs in pecuniary units up to the height of compensation. The height of 
compensation limits augmentation of nature conservation area by land that has previously not 
being allocated for nature conservation purposes. Therefore, the influence of subsidies on an 
increase in nature conservation in quantity and quality can be critically scrutinized. Kaeser et al. 
(2013) and Kaeser & Zimmermann (2014) examined the influence of (1) financial conditions of 
cantons and (2) financial incentives for biodiversity on the delimitation of forest reserve areas in 
Switzerland. While the first variable is of significant importance for the amount of forest 
reserves, the second variable is not, and the height of incentives are perceived as rather modest.  
 
Hypothesis 9: 
Assuming a determined height of pecuniary compensation, more nature conservation will be 
supplied on land with low site conditions than on land with high site condition, ceteris paribus. 
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Hypothesis 10: 
Assuming a determined height of pecuniary compensation, more conservation measures are 
implemented on land with already high conservation status than on land with presently no or 
low conservation status, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 are applicable to individuals and collectives. For the latter, I consider two 
identical collectives with an equal revenue sharing system, equal voting rule and equal 
distribution of the individual preferences, but different conservation status. 
 
When compensation is paid, the budget is generated by expenditure shares of the collective’s 
members. With the share the individuals pay, they relate an amount of nature conservation they 
demand. When no evaluation-based expenditure sharing system is applied, no unanimously 
collective outcome will evolve and different perceptions on the demanded amount related to the 
total budget will exist. In addition to that, an expenditure sharing system does not usually allow 
transparency of an individual’s contribution to the total budget. Further, the individual does not 
know how much other members of the collective pay. Obviously, for drawing a relationship 
between paid expenditure shares and quantities it lacks the relevant data. In contrast to the 
obscure demand-side, the supply-side, especially individual supply, is much more transparent 
and allows adjustment of compensation to obtain specific conservation aims. 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Exogenously Determined Quantities 
 
Examples of exogenously determined quantities of nature conservation are the German National 
Strategy on Biological Diversity, with an increase in wilderness areas up to 2% of German land 
area (and up to 5% of German forest area (BMUB 2015b: 31)), and the number of proposed Sites 
of Community Importance (pSCI) according to the HD demanded by the European Commission, 
the number of habitat trees per hectare or an increasing harvesting age. These determinations 
imply an increase in nature conservation area. If I assume that these exogenously determined 
quantities are realized on land that was previously not used for the purpose of nature 
conservation, these determinations will lead to:  
 Budget deficits or decreasing quality of nature conservation when a balanced budget is the 
aim and when individual suppliers are considered (see points G and G’ in figure 4.4). 
 Ambiguous changes in the quality of nature conservation (depending on received height of 
payments) if collective suppliers and non-evaluation-based revenue sharing is considered.   
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Obviously, to some individuals or collectives, the exogenously determined quantity might be 
lower compared to the equilibrium quantity. This is illustrated with points F and F’ in figure 4.4. 
 
4.3.3 Takings 
 
Legally binding regulations (for instance the Federal Nature Conservation Act, the Federal 
Hunting Act, regulations of protected areas) are of a huge importance for implementation of 
environmental and nature conservation (Wegener 1994: 6). They are of a positive or negative 
kind (Wegener 1998: 219) and (re-)distribute property rights among the members of a 
collective. A precondition is that these property rights are defined, for instance the right to 
choose tree species, to hike, to collect mushrooms, to construct forest roads and so forth.  
 
As a consequence of the choice of legal regulations (see Schmack et al. 2013: 41), a landowner 
(regardless of whether he is a single individual or a municipality) that previously owned the 
right to choose the species his land property shall comprise now has limited leeway for choosing 
plant and animal species. Furthermore, he has to communicate this with the responsible 
administrative authority to whom the property right of choosing tree species is transferred. 
Obviously, his property right was confiscated and the landowner received nothing in return.  
 
The question also arises of whether single individuals can be demanders and takings are applied. 
This might be the case on a local stage, when for instance single ornithologists campaign for the 
designation of land area that is in individual or collective ownership. But even if this might 
succeed, the single ornithologist cannot be certain whether other individuals benefit from the 
implementation of nature conservation via takings or not. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 The Habitats Directive 
 
The structure of takings for implementing nature conservation can be found in various legally 
binding regulations that are passed on the regional, national and supranational European stage. 
The result of the application of takings are observable: nature conservation is implemented with 
reduced quality and resentment increases of individuals whose property rights are confiscated. 
As an example, the HD can be applied.  
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As a directive passed by the Council of the European Union, the Member States are obliged to 
transpose and enforce the directive according to Article 288 TFEU. The core of the HD is the 
designation of SACs for establishing a coherent network. These sites or habitats, be they farm 
land, forests or lakes, are in public, municipal or private ownership.  
 
The amount of terrestrial pSCI amounts to 7.2% in Great Britain and 35.5% in Slovenia (stated: 
June 2011). The European average amounts to 13.6%. According to the Federal Agency for 
Nature Conservation, Germany proposed 4,606 sites to the EC, representing 9.3%of the 
terrestrial surface of Germany (stated on the 3rd of January 2014). 16% of German forests (≙ 
1.75 M ha) are classified as natural habitat types of community interest (17) according to HD 
Annex I, of which 7.5% (816,000 ha) are designated as SACs (Lehrke et al. 2013: 18, BfN 2014a). 
 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Implementation Deficits 
 
The implementation of this supranational directive is linked with huge delay, dissatisfaction and 
difficulties (Krott 2000; Paavola 2004; Louette et al. 2011; Evans 2012). This is supported by the 
overview in figure 4.5 that lists the duration of the implementation process of the Member States 
of 1992. The delayed implementation is a general result. Jordan (1999) and Treib (2014) 
characterized the implementation deficits as a general appearance of environmental regulations 
passed by the Council of the European Union. 
 
Dissatisfaction was uttered not only by individual landowners, but by the administrative body as 
well. Implementation of the HD is influencing the height of owner's income, whereby usually a 
reducing effect is expected. Financial compensation (e.g. in the form of subsidies) could not be 
guaranteed at the early stage of site designation since the degree of impact could not be 
estimated at this early stage. Implications on owners and users only became visible step by step 
with the progress of practical implementation. Weber & Christophersen (2002) and Sauer et al. 
(2005: 20ff.) hint at the rejection of the aims of Natura 2000 by the forest circle, who understand 
the HD as a threat and a loss of productive area (EC 2015b: 29). In contrast to that, Winter et al. 
(2014) revealed little influence by the implementation of the HD on local forest management in 
beech forests. Flade et al. (2004) listed recommendations for the management of beech forests 
that are designated as SACs, for instance no soil cultivation and preparation, removal and no 
introduction of non-native tree species and of tree species that are not associated with the 
vegetation unit (for instance Douglas fir and common spruce), no clear cutting, no shelterwood 
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cutting, and no harvesting during the breeding season (from March to July). These measures 
were confirmed by an online survey of 89 forest enterprises (EC 2015b: 29ff.).  
 
When considering the behavior of landowners or individuals who supply nature conservation 
and are confronted with takings, they aim at reducing the risk of being confronted with takings 
without just compensation. If landowners know that species rich land areas are taken before 
species poor land they would reduce the number of species on this land (Innes 1997). The 
previously existing incentive to provide voluntarily biological diverse land by individual or 
collective owners has vanished.  
 
In addition to landowners' objections, agencies complained about the personal and financial 
shortcomings to ensure implementation of the HD (Sauer et al. 2005: 19ff.). If the staff that is 
commissioned with the enforcement of the HD was not augmented, the time the official could 
spend on this issue depends on the other remaining tasks.22 Further, more expenses became 
urgent for obtaining broader and more detailed information about the distribution of species 
and qualities of relevant habitats during the stage of site designation, for the designing of 
management plans (that is placed to third parties), and the process of civic involvement. The 
delay of conducting measures by administrative agencies that are urgent for transposing and 
implementing the HD on the national and regional stage is a consequence of applying the 
institutional arrangement of takings.  
 
Property rights, previously owned by regional and national administrative bodies, are 
transferred to the European Commission which decided on the number of SACs and shall receive 
recurring reports. With this, a change of responsibility is conducted. Furthermore, property 
rights previously owned by landowners are transferred to regional authorities since 
management aims and measures of the considered areas are determined in management plans, 
whose legal obligation varies between the Laender. 
 
 
                                                          
22 This situation gives a huge administrative discretion to officials who can often decide according to their 
own preferences with which task to proceed. With this, bureaucrats distribute their attention and time. 
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1  complete national list according to Member State, information transmitted is coherent 
2  substantial national list but information still incomplete 
3  partial but insufficient national list 
0  list insignificant or not transmitted 
 
Figure 4.5: Process of Site Proposition by the Member States of the European Union of 1992. Source: Natura 2000 European Commission Nature and Biodiversity Newsletter 
(1996 – 2014), published by the European Commission 
 
  
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium                  
Denmark                  
Germany                  
Greece                  
Spain                  
France                  
Ireland                  
Italy                  
Luxembourg                  
The 
Netherlands 
                 
Portugal                  
UK                  
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4.3.3.1.2 Consequences 
 
The HD and the subsequent designation of SACs and preparation of management plans are 
examples of an implementation of nature conservation via takings. Demand is expressed 
collectively (by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, or by nature 
conservation organizations that prepare shadow lists23). Supply can be either individual or 
collective – on land that is owned by single individuals, families, municipalities, Laender or 
nations. If nature conservation is implemented by confiscation, the illustrated results (missing 
acceptance, implementation delay) are not astonishing and no surprise. In contrast: results that 
can be explained with the simple applied model should be expected. With the support of the 
model of demand and supply, expectations on the success of implementation of nature 
conservation can be guessed more realistically. Takings, applied in the form of additional legal 
regulations, will imply a missing acceptance of nature conservation and increase the harm to 
those individuals and collectives whose property rights are confiscated. Suppliers that are 
confronted with takings have to supply quantity A although they would voluntarily supply 
quantity A’, which is located in the second quadrant (see figure 4.4). The suppliers would 
voluntarily provide the determined quantity A, if they receive payments at the height of C’.  
 
Despite these findings, I observe a recurrence of this dissatisfying structure (e.g. new 
conservation areas are designated, new legally binding instruments are passed or amended). 
 
 
4.3.4 Co-Existence of Three Institutional Arrangements 
 
Apparently, all three different institutional arrangements co-exist. Nature conservation is not 
implemented based on the application of solely one institution, for instance legal regulations. 
The parallel existence indicates that neither demanders nor suppliers are the sole beneficiaries 
of the chosen institution. Moreover, different conditions – concerning individual preferences, the 
number of suppliers and demanders – will result in the fact that individuals choose different 
institutional arrangements. This might be the case when the institutions for implementing 
nature conservation of different administrative units at the same or different levels are 
considered and compared. Although legal regulations are of supranational, national or regional 
validity, the application of compensation in terms of funding guidelines or voluntary exchanges 
vary between the Laender, administrative districts and municipalities. This is supported by the 
                                                          
23 This instrument was used for instance by the Austrian Umweltdachverband in 2012. 
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findings of Kaeser et al. (2013), who illustrated that neither solely command-and-control-
mechanisms nor solely information, consultation and persuasion and/or voluntary financial 
incentives are a guarantee for reaching forest conservation objectives in Switzerland. 
 
The coexistence of different institutions for implementing nature conservation hints at the 
presence of decentralized rules for exchange of property rights that are allocated to nature 
conservation. No exclusive central governance exists, though I assume that central governmental 
arrangements are still of major importance in the field of nature conservation. Although takings 
are the least preferred institution by individuals and collectives (see section 3.8.1) that are 
confronted with the resulting harm, circumstances might exist in which individuals voluntarily 
and mutually agree on the application of takings. This choice for takings might be reasoned in 
the fact that other institutions might be too cumbersome and the individuals of a society 
voluntarily agree on imposing coercion on themselves. In this context it appears consequently to 
avoid “institutional monocropping” (Ostrom 2014: 26) and to understand “[…] that overly 
simplified characterizations of governance arrangements are not sufficient to predict results." 
(Ostrom 2011: 61). 
 
 
4.4 Comparison to Studies in the Field of Nature Conservation Economics 
 
Reasoned in the application of 
 Buchanan’s understanding of costs as a subjective valuation of the lost alternative, 
 methodological individualism and the concept of homo economicus, 
 the property rights approach, 
 the public choice-oriented analysis of different institutional and organizational 
arrangements for implementing nature conservation within a democratic society,  
the dissertation differs in several points from economic studies that also examine the 
implementation of nature conservation.  
 
 No reduction to monetary units 
The present dissertation differs from studies that apply cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) (see for 
instance Mayer 2014) with its diverse indirect and direct methods for determining aggregated 
macroeconomic benefits (e.g. travel cost method, contingent valuation method (Hampicke 1991: 
114ff.)) and costs (Hampicke 1991: 136ff.).  
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Many values (and with this costs – in applying the understanding of James M. Buchanan 
(1999a)) cannot be expressed and quantified sufficiently in monetary units (Sen 2000: 943f.; 
Ekardt & Hennig: 2015: 70ff.). With this, CBA is restricted to market exchanges where goods are 
traded that have prices (Mankiw 2001: 231). Many attempts have been made to use pecuniary 
units as a reference for describing the individual's value of nature conservation (Dieter et al. 
2010; Hanley et al. 2013: 39ff.). Küpker et al. (2005) and Meyerhoff et al. (2006) for instance 
investigated the public’s willingness to pay for an increase in biodiversity in parts of Germany. If 
we transfer the CBA to nature conservation, we construct an imaginary market for the good 
"nature conservation" and can only make propositions on the benefits of conservation measures 
if individuals would choose the market institution instead of the political one. The same is valid 
for cost-effectiveness-analysis (CES) (Hansjürgens & Lienhoop 2015: 77f.).  
 
Furthermore, user, existence, bequest, and option values are specified in monetary terms, 
although they are not exchanged via markets (see an overview of studies in Hampicke 1991: 
126ff.) and no real prices exist. With this expression in monetary terms, subjective values are 
misleadingly objectified with the consequence of obscuring subjectivity. 
 
With the reduction in costs on monetary units, not all relevant property rights for implementing 
nature conservation are covered, for instance the access right. If this reduction is applied, 
property rights or alternatives that are abandoned for implementing nature conservation are 
limited to the right to generate income (Rosenkranz et al. 2014) and to spend it (Grunewald et 
al. 2014; Wüstemann et al. 2014; Rühs & Wüstemann 2015). Exactly this happens if nature 
conservation is only linked with reduced income and higher expenditures (e.g. decreased 
harvesting or set-aside of land, hedge planting, river restoration). 
 
 No reduction to landowners 
Dissatisfaction and missing benefits cannot sufficiently be explained with an understanding of 
costs that is limited to objective monetary terms (reduced income, required budget for 
conservation measures and so forth) and which ignores subjective valuation of the choosing 
individuals, as for instance in Rosenkranz et al. (2014). Rosenkranz et al. (2014) show that 
average annual income losses for forest enterprises, resulting from the designation as SACs, vary 
from 31€/ha24 to 39€/ha25. They correctly argue that unspecified and equal lump-sum 
payments are not appropriate for setting the right incentive for increasing the amount of 
                                                          
24 Comparing the "Status Quo" to the "FFH-Regime": the income loss varies between 0 and 149€/ha*a. 
“FFH-Regime” means changed management reasoned in site designation as an SAC. 
 
25 Comparing the "Enterprise Objective" to the "FFH-Regime": the income loss varies between 0 and 
173€/ha*a. 
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property rights allocated to nature conservation, although forest enterprises would prefer this 
kind of compensation (EC 2015b: 30). Rosenkranz et al. (2014) reasoned this with the diversity 
of forest enterprises and their site and silvicultural conditions. But they neglect individual 
preferences of the enterprise owners. If this approach by Rosenkranz et al. (2014) is followed, 
costs for nature conservation are reduced to pecuniary units and can only be assigned to those 
individuals who are confronted with income losses or higher expenditure, as for instance 
(forest) landowners might be (Volz 1992; Main et al. 1999). This implies a reduction in the 
consequences of nature conservation solely on landowners. 
 
The present dissertation extends this limited understanding of costs. As a consequence, not only 
are landowners confronted with the cost of nature conservation, but so are all the members of 
society who have to abandon property rights for the purpose of nature conservation.  
 
 The ignorance of the chosen institution and individual perspective within collective choices 
CBA offers a calculation for the whole entity of a collective, for instance a municipality, from a 
macroeconomic perspective. For this, "benefits" and "costs" are summed up or are averaged 
(Sen 2000: 938; Hansjürgens & Lienhoop 2015: 48). Individual perspective is neglected and no 
information is given on the individual costs and benefits of the members of the considered 
collective (e.g. is a minority or a majority confronted with costs). The process and the rules of 
determining a collective outcome based on n individual choices is ignored. When applying a CBA, 
no information is given on the organization of demand and supply and on the rules of collective 
choice-making.  
 
Maybe the approach of this thesis can be a gain even for research in the field of political sciences 
that tried to analyze implementation deficits of European environmental directives from a non–
individualistic point of view. A huge body of research and literature exists that examines 
implementation deficits of supranational legislation (see for instance Bähr (2006); Dimitrova & 
Steunenberg (2000); Falkner et al. (2004 and 2005); Falkner & Treib (2008); Mastenbroek & 
Kaeding (2006); Steunenberg (2006 and 2007); Treib (2003 and 2014) and Versluis (2004)). In 
these studies it is assumed that passed regulations are exactly implemented without 
contradiction. Problems such as implementation delays, low implementation quality or missing 
acceptance are not expected. The individual as the smallest choice-making unit and the 
consequences of the chosen institution are excluded. These studies lack inclusion of (1) the 
process of determining collective outcomes for demand and supply of nature conservation, and 
(2) the application of coercion for implementing nature conservation. This passing of legally 
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binding environmental regulations, and subsequent national and regional transposition and 
implementation, implied a revival of implementation research (Schofield 2001).  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Not only landowners are confronted with costs for demanding and supplying nature 
conservation. Even individuals with no land property, but who have property rights on land, are 
confronted with subjective costs. Costs for nature conservation cannot be reduced to monetary 
units, for instance reduced income or higher expenditure for conservation measures.  
 
The applied model enables us to analyze different presently applied institutional and 
organizational arrangements of practical nature conservation.  
 
In contrast to individually made choices, every collective choice on one single issue can imply 
that not each individual preference is represented by collective outcome. Obviously nature 
conservation is no exception.  
 
Solely voluntary exchanges ensure a mutual beneficiary implementation of nature conservation. 
If collectives interact, only one expenditure and revenue sharing system exists that allows (1) 
voluntary exchange between collectives which is mutual beneficiary and further that allows (2) 
efficient implementation of nature conservation, assuming that decision-making cost are 
neglected. The application of evaluation-based sharing systems implies that not only monetary 
units are used as an exchange item, but that the different alternatives the individuals would 
abandon for additional nature conservation are considered as well. If alternative sharing 
systems are applied or solely money is used as expenditures and revenues, implementation of 
nature conservation might fail. If voluntary exchange succeeds nevertheless, the collectives’ 
members still perceive it as the best alternative (compared to individual demand and supply or a 
change in collective) for implementing nature conservation.  
 
Individual and collective suppliers would increase implementation of nature conservation 
voluntarily if they could be certain of being paid for their efforts to ensure successful 
implementation of nature conservation. These efforts comprise property rights the suppliers 
abandon for the purpose of nature conservation. 
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Although voluntary exchanges have the ability to guarantee mutual acceptance for the 
implementation of nature conservation, the institution of voluntary exchanges is placed on 
position three of the demanders’ and suppliers’ preference lists. Up to now, voluntary exchanges 
appear to be of minor importance.  
 
The present discussion in the field of nature conservation reveals that this might change. 
Demand is expressed to include more an economic and less a regulatory approach for 
implementation of nature conservation (Kirchgässner & Schneider 2003; TAB 2014: 9ff.; NABU 
2015). If “economic” is understood as a voluntary, mutual beneficiary exchange between 
individuals or collectives, this new orientation can be successful. But if “economic” is reduced to 
monetary units and limited solely to landowners, the approach will fail. The previous 
argumentation can be included in considerations on a modification of the present EU funding of 
nature conservation. 
 
If eminent domain in combination with an evaluation-based sharing system is applied, higher 
(lower) exogenously determined payments will result in an over-supply (over-demand) and 
higher (lower) exogenously determined quantities will result in a budget deficit (budget 
surplus). In addition to that, the quality of implemented nature conservation changes (a lower 
quality in the case of a budget deficit, and a higher quality in the case of a budget surplus), but 
the choosing individuals have no incentive to change their choice. This results in a complaint 
about the implemented nature conservation (that is perceived either as too low or too high) and 
in an unwillingness to change the choices made. 
 
The use of eminent domain in combination with a non-evaluation-based sharing system implies 
that some collective members are harmed and some benefit. The first group will respond with a 
decreasing acceptance for nature conservation issues. 
 
Furthermore, I recommend being utterly careful with the introduction of exogenously 
determined payments (especially if they are reduced to monetary units) and quantities. The fact 
that collectives differ regarding their members’ preferences, their already practiced nature 
conservation (and with this their height of costs for additional nature conservation), and their 
sharing systems implies ambiguous results regarding the implemented quantity and quality of 
nature conservation.  
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When nature conservation is financed by funding guidelines, the feedback is apparent: missing 
grant applications indicate that the incentives to supply nature conservation are too low and 
may not even compensate the efforts for making a request.  
 
When increasing demand for nature conservation, individuals – regardless of demanding 
individually or collectively – have to be aware that either their expenditures increase (when a 
voluntary exchange and an eminent domain will be applied) or their satiation level is still not 
met by the present amount of implemented nature conservation. If the latter is the case, 
individuals and collectives will assume they receive the good "nature conservation" for free. 
 
Takings represent the institution that is preferred most by those, whose property rights are not 
confiscated, and is preferred least by those whose property rights are confiscated. Every 
additional application of takings that aims to implement nature conservation decreases the 
acceptance of nature conservation measures by those collectives and individuals who are 
confronted with confiscations. Reasoned in the declining acceptance of takings by those whose 
property rights are confiscated and the decreasing quality of implemented nature conservation, 
it appears astonishing that takings still represent the major important institution for 
implementing nature conservation. 
 
The derived conclusions based on a model that excludes transaction costs, considers only the 
good “nature conservation” and examines “nature conservation” as a normal economic good. 
The integration of  
 strictness as an endogenous variable, 
 different more than one property right that is allocated to nature conservation, 
 transaction costs,  
 other goods that are demanded and supplied together with “nature conservation”, and 
 treatment of nature conservation as an inferior good  
might form objects for further research.  
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